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CONDEMN (THE) NATION: HOLDING THE UNITED STATES 
ACCOUNTABLE THROUGH INVERSE CONDEMNATION 
CLAIMS FOR ITS ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT—AND THEN 
FAILING TO MITIGATE AND ADAPT TO CERTAIN 
EFFECTS OF—CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
JOSEPH ROSENBERG† 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since around 1880, the Earth has warmed more than 1.8ºF, 
and scientific consensus indicates that it will warm at least another 
                                                 
† Thanks and affection go to Professor Joseph Singer (who offered comments on several 
drafts), Benjamin Rosenberg (who also offered comments on previous drafts), Karen Shaer, 
Jessica Rosenberg, Lisa Hansmann, Professor Richard Lazarus, Professor Jody Freeman, and 
all those at the Buffalo Environmental Law Journal who helped edit this Article. This Article 
was completed in Spring 2018 and so reflects the state of the law and the world at that time. 
In most respects, developments since then have strengthened the Article’s claim. For instance, 
federal environmental deregulation has continued apace, while major weather events (such as 
the 2018 California wildfires) devastated private land; environmental reports (such as the 
second volume of the NCA4 and an IPCC special report) have underlined the gravity of 
climate change. However, one case on which I rely—Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United 
States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687 (2015)—was pending on appeal last spring and has since been 
reversed by the Federal Circuit, see Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354 
(Fed. Cir. 2018). The reversal certainly shows how difficult it can be to convince courts of 
the correctness of ambitious takings claims. But I believe the Federal Circuit’s decision is 
wrong as a matter of law, and I hope that it will eventually be seen as such. This Article 
examines Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t most closely in Part VI to show that governmental 
inaction can form part of the basis for a taking. Despite the reversal, I believe that that is still 
correct as a matter of law for the other reasons given in Part VI and on the strength of the 
authorities cited therein. In addition, while the Court of Federal Claims’ opinion in Saint 
Bernard Par. Gov’t has been reversed, its reasoning is still compelling, and may be accepted 
in different forums; federal district courts have original jurisdiction—concurrent with the 
Court of Federal Claims—over inverse condemnation claims alleging under $10,000 in 
damages, see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2012).  
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1.8ºF.1 Most of the warming to date has occurred since 1970,2 and the 
pace of warming has seemed to accelerate since then: the seventeen 
hottest years on record have occurred in the past eighteen years.3 
Almost everyone agrees that this warming is anthropogenic—caused 
by humans—through burning fossil fuels that emit greenhouse gases 
(GHGs), the most important of which is carbon dioxide (CO2).
4 These 
GHGs warm our planet by lingering in the atmosphere and trapping 
heat, just like the roof of a greenhouse. Global warming has led to 
widespread, rapid changes in our climate.  
Anthropogenic global warming—and thus anthropogenic 
climate change—is almost universally accepted in the international 
and United States’ scientific communities,5 seemingly accepted in the 
United States’ legal community,6 but much less accepted in certain 
                                                 
1 Henry Fountain et al., 2017 Was One of the Hottest Years on Record. And That Was Without 
El Niño, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/18/climate/hottest-year-2017.html; Camila 
Domonoske, So What Exactly is in the Paris Climate Accord?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 1, 
2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/01/531048986/so-what-exactly-
is-in-the-paris-climate-accord (noting that Paris Climate Agreement’s goal was to achieve the 
best-case scenario of restricting future warming to 3.6ºF). 
2
 Rebecca Lindsey & LuAnn Dahlman, Climate Change: Global Temperature, NAT’L 
OCEANIC ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (NOAA) (Aug. 1, 2018) https://www.climate.gov/news-
features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-temperature; THE ROYAL SOC’Y 
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., CLIMATE CHANGE: EVIDENCE AND CAUSES 2 (2014) (“Human 
activities—especially the burning of fossil fuels since the start of the Industrial Revolution—
have increased atmospheric CO2 concentrations by about 40%, with more than half the 
increase occurring since 1970.”). 
3 See Fountain, supra note 1. 
4 UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 14 (4th ed. 2016) (explaining that the three most-abundant GHGs—in 
decreasing order of volume emitted—are CO2, methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O)); see 
also THOMAS L. BREWER, THE UNITED STATES IN A WARMING WORLD 47 (2015) (listing 
studies). 
5 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Climate Change 2014 
Synthesis Report (2015) (hereinafter referred to as the “IPCC 5TH SYNTHESIS REPORT”); 
Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the 
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1189-90 (2009) (“The long-
awaited, and much-debated, scientific consensus regarding climate change cause and 
effect is now at hand.”). 
6 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 521-23 (2007) (documenting 
the Court’s acknowledgment that “[t]he harms associated with climate change are serious and 
well recognized,” and that there exists “a causal connection between manmade greenhouse 
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sectors of the United States’ political community.7 The United States 
has played an extremely prominent role in anthropogenic climate 
change: it is the single largest contributor historically to the artificial 
emission of GHGs. Between 1850 and 2011, the United States 
contributed 27 percent of global cumulative CO2 emissions. Today, 
the United States is the world’s second-largest GHG emitter, behind 
China.8 
The most well-documented, detrimental effects of global 
warming are rising sea levels and rising average surface 
temperatures.9 Scientists are confident (with varying degrees of 
certainty) that global warming has led to other, more extreme climate 
events too, such as heat wave, drought, and more frequent and 
powerful storms.10 The brunt of climate change is borne unequally: 
coastal and equatorial communities (often the most vulnerable and 
least culpable populations) feel the effects most acutely.11 Many 
                                                 
gas emissions and global warming”). 
7 For instance, Republican President Donald Trump outwardly denies that global warming 
exists. See, Dylan Matthews, Donald Trump Has Tweeted Climate Change Skepticism 115 
Times. Here’s All of It., VOX (June 1, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2017/6/1/15726472/trump-tweets-global-warming-paris-climate-agreement 
(compiling Trump tweets disparaging climate change as fake, a hoax, or a “canard”). 
President Trump’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator does not believe 
CO2 is a primary contributor to global warming. See Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Chief Doubts 
Consensus View of Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/us/politics/epa-scott-pruitt-global-warming.html. It is 
arguable that the modern Republican Party does not support the view that anthropogenic 
climate change exists. See CHRISTOPHER J. BAILEY, US CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 34–35 
(2015); GOP Deeply Divided Over Climate Change, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 1, 2013), 
http://www.people-press.org/2013/11/01/gop-deeply-divided-over-climate-change/ (finding 
that while 84% of Democrats believe in climate change, only 46% of Republicans do).  
8 Mengpin Ge et al., 6 Graphs Explain the World’s Top 10 Emitters, WORLD RESOURCES 
INSTITUTE (Nov. 25, 2014), https://wri.org/blog/2014/11/6-graphs-explain-
world%E2%80%99s-top-10-emitters. 
9 IPCC 5TH SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
10 Id. at 53 (“It is likely that the frequency of heat waves has increased in large parts of Europe, 
Asia, and Australia.”); CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS, supra note 4, at 25 (“The [USGCRP] 
and the [IPCC] project that, more likely than not, tropical cyclones will become more intense 
over the 21st century, with higher wind speeds and heavier rains.”). 
11 Nicholas Kristof, Swallowed by the Sea, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/19/opinion/sunday/climate-change-bangladesh.html; 
Mike Ives, A Remote Pacific Nation, Threatened by Rising Seas, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/world/asia/climate-change-kiribati.html; DAVID 
ARCHER, THE LONG THAW 53 (2009) (“[N]egative impacts of climate change will be felt most 
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Americans already feel the effects of climate change and many more 
will: in 2010, 39 percent of the United States’ population lived in 
shoreline counties, meaning they were potentially subject to floods 
from sea level rise and storm surge, and might even be forced from 
their homes in the future.12 If this sounds far-fetched, consider that 
America already has climate change refugees: a federal relocation 
program is currently underway for residents of an island off the coast 
of Louisiana,13 and a Virginian island in Chesapeake Bay is not far 
behind.14 Climate change is a present and pressing reality, even if its 
full effects won’t be felt for decades and centuries to come.  
The most logical way for the United States to address the 
dangers of climate change is through the democratic process by 
passing climate change legislation.15 In 2009, the 111th Congress 
attempted just that, but the attempt failed the following year in the 
                                                 
severely in under-developed countries.”). 
12 What Percentage of the American Population Lives Near the Coast?, NOAA, 
https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/population.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2018); see 
Dominique Mosbergen, Climate Change May Force Millions of Americans to Move Inland, 
HUFFPOST (May 22, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/sea-level-climate-
migrants-united-states_us_591a9e93e4b0809be157a253. 
13 Coral Davenport and Campbell Robertson, Resettling the First American ‘Climate 
Refugees’, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/us/resettling-
the-first-american-climate-refugees.html; Tristan Baurik, Here’s Where Residents of Sinking 
Isle de Jean Charles Will Relocate, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Dec. 20, 2017), 
http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2017/12/site_chosen_for_relocating_isl.html 
(last updated Dec. 20, 2017); Kevin Sack and John Schwartz, Left to Louisiana’s Tides, a 
Village Fights for Time, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/24/us/jean-lafitte-
floodwaters.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=span-ab-top-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news (pointing out 
that on Louisiana’s coast “a football field’s worth of wetlands . . . vanishes every 100 
minutes”). 
14 See Jon Gertner, Should the United States Save Tangier Island From Oblivion?, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/10/magazine/should-the-united-states-
save-tangier-island-from-oblivion.html; see also GARY GRIGGS, COASTS IN CRISIS: A GLOBAL 
CHALLENGE (2017). 
15 Combating climate change is so difficult because polluting the atmosphere is “a classic 
example [of] . . . the tragedy of the commons [in which] [i]ndividuals profit from releasing 
CO2, but everyone collectively pays the price. Each individual’s incentive in such a situation 
is to exploit the common resource to the maximum extent.” THE LONG THAW, supra note 11, 
at 159. 
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Senate.16 Since then, climate change legislation looks less and less 
likely.17 As a result, some plaintiffs are taking to the courts to make 
novel but plausible claims attempting to hold the United States 
government accountable for its role in promoting global warming and 
not adapting to its effects.18 These suits have focused, for instance, on 
the public trust doctrine,19 the federal common law claim of public 
nuisance,20 the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),21 and the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.22 A few suits have 
concerned inverse condemnation claims that rely on the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause.23 In fact, in the wake of Hurricane 
Harvey in the fall of 2017, plaintiffs filed scores of takings claims in 
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.24 
                                                 
16 See Evan Lehmann, Senate Abandons Climate Effort, Dealing Blow to President, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/07/23/23climatewire-senate-
abandons-climate-effort-dealing-blow-88864.html?pagewanted=all.  
17 Compare Lazarus, supra note 5, at 1153 (claiming in July 2009 that “[c]limate change may 
soon have its ‘lawmaking moment’ in the United States”) with Nadja Popovich et al., 67 
Environmental Rules on the Way Out Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/05/climate/trump-environment-rules-
reversed.html (detailing Trump’s rollbacks of prior efforts to combat climate change). 
18 See UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, THE STATUS OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 
10, (2017) (recording that the U.S. has hosted almost three times as much climate change 
litigation as all other countries combined); see also Alfred T. Goodwin, A Wake-Up Call for 
Judges, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 785 (2015) (arguing that courts should be even more proactive 
about filling this gap in the democratic process). 
19 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (foundation of public trust doctrine); 
Juliana v. United States, 217 F.Supp.3d 1224 (D. Oregon 2016) (holding that the public trust 
doctrine can apply to the federal government); but see PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 
576, 603 (2012) (“[T]he public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law.”). 
20 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d American Elec. 
Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (finding, although later reversed, that 
the Clean Air Act did not displace federal common law claim of public nuisance). 
21 Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 696 F.3d 436, 449–52 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding that 
discretionary function exception immunized Army Corps of Engineers in this instance), cert. 
denied, Lattimore v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2855 (2013). 
22 Juliana, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1250 (“[T]he right to a climate system capable of sustaining 
human life is fundamental to a free and ordered society.”); cf. In re Maui Elec. Co., No. 
SCWC-15-0000640 (Haw. Dec. 14, 2017) (finding that Hawaiian citizen-plaintiffs had 
asserted a “protectable property interest in a clean and healthful environment”). 
23 Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687 (2015). 
24 The Flood of Takings Cases After Hurricane Harvey, TAKINGS LITIGATION (Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://takingslitigation.com/2017/10/23/the-flood-of-takings-cases-after-hurricane-harvey/ 
(focusing on the ACE’s decisions regarding controlled flooding in Harvey’s aftermath).  
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Plaintiffs enjoy certain advantages in bringing an inverse 
condemnation claim rather than, say, a tort case under the FTCA. 
First, the government has waived sovereign immunity under the 
Tucker Act for claims based on the Constitution,25 whereas the FTCA 
contains only a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.26 Consider two 
cases following Hurricane Katrina that attempted to hold the United 
States liable for its role in constructing a canal that it failed to maintain 
and which thus exacerbated the Hurricane’s effects. While the FTCA 
case was dismissed under the discretionary function exception,27 the 
Fifth Amendment takings case initially succeeded.28 One further 
advantage is that the United States is generally exempt from flood 
liability stemming from federal flood control projects,29 but it is not 
exempt from claims originating in the Constitution.30 
This paper will examine the merits of a particular kind of 
inverse condemnation claim. Thus, it will not address questions of 
“nonjusticiability,” like standing and political question doctrine. 
However, a short word: while these issues may be thorny,31 they are 
unlikely to present a stumbling block—both for the three successful 
scenarios contemplated by this paper infra, and for other, more 
ambitious claims: plaintiffs have survived motions to dismiss on 
standing and political question grounds from extremely unlikely 
positions in the climate change arena. For example, petitioners in 
Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency satisfied standing requirements 
even though they sought a very small reduction in global GHG 
emissions.32 And, in Juliana v. United States, a group of young 
plaintiffs sued the federal government, asserting an implied 
                                                 
25 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012). 
26 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2012) (announcing the FTCA’s discretionary function exception). 
27 See Katrina, 696 F.3d at 449. 
28 Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 746, rev’d 887 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
29 Flood Control Act of 1928, 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2012) (“No liability of any kind shall attach 
to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any 
place.”) 
30 § 1491(a)(1). 
31 JACQUELINE PEEL AND HARI M. OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: REGULATORY 
PATHWAYS TO CLEANER ENERGY 272 (2015) (discussing such issues). 
32 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525–26 (“A reduction in domestic emissions would slow 
the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere.”). 
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fundamental right to a stable climate; the case was not dismissed as a 
nonjusticiable political question.33  
As yet, no plaintiff has brought a successful inverse 
condemnation suit against the United States where the federal 
government’s liability stems from its dual role in bringing about 
climate change through encouraging and incentivizing GHG-emitting 
activities and in failing to mitigate and adapt to particular climate 
change effects that the United States was under a duty to address. But 
both precedent and legal theory suggest that some such claims could, 
in fact, succeed.34  
As the primary regulator of the fossil fuel industry, the federal 
government has inspired the most GHG emissions of any country in 
history. At the same time, the United States government has not done 
nearly enough to mitigate emissions or adapt to their effects even 
when under constitutional and statutory duties to do so and when it 
knew or should have known of the significant risk of serious harms 
posed by those effects. Still, the federal government is hardly the only 
party responsible for climate change: globally, most GHGs were 
emitted outside the United States, private companies actually emitted 
most GHGs within the United States, and extreme weather did not 
begin in 1970. It is important to note the limits of the claim advanced 
here: The United States cannot be liable for every climate change-
induced harm caused by rising sea level, storm surge, or wildfire.  
Courts should evaluate such claims based on a five-factor test 
that builds on the tests used in Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United 
States35 and Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States.36 Specifically, 
courts should consider: (1) protectable property interest, (2) character 
of property and reasonable investment-backed expectations, (3) 
                                                 
33 Juliana, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1235–1242 (examining the six factors from Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186 (1962)). 
34 See infra Part III (detailing three successful scenarios). Note also that even unsuccessful 
claims would highlight the federal government’s inadequate response to climate change. See, 
e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Hurricane Katrina Decision Highlights Liability for Decaying 
Infrastructure, N.Y. L. J. (2012); PEEL, supra note 31, at 153 (“[E]ven if not successful . . . 
these tort cases . . . make governments more likely to engage in proactive planning to avoid 
costly litigation and reputational damage.”). 
35 568 U.S. 23 (2012). 
36 See Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t, supra note 23. 
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foreseeability, (4) causation, and (5) substantiality. Causation will 
undoubtedly require the lion’s share of courts’ attention. While courts 
have not clearly articulated a single causation test that satisfies the 
constitutional obligation to compensate for takings,37 courts seem to 
mirror the causation test from tort law—that is, some form of cause-
in-fact and proximate cause are both necessary.  
In examining cause-in-fact, courts should first determine 
whether a preponderance of the evidence suggests that the underlying 
cause of plaintiff’s harm was an effect of climate change. This inquiry 
could be either easy or difficult depending on the underlying cause. If 
the preponderance of the evidence indicates that climate change was 
the underlying cause of plaintiff’s harm, courts should next determine 
whether the United States government’s role in promoting climate 
change in addition to its failure to adapt adequately to the particular 
climate change effect at issue—through either inadequate 
governmental action or inaction when under a duty to act—indicates 
that the federal government was a “substantial factor” of plaintiff’s 
harm.  
Once cause-in-fact is satisfied, the court must evaluate 
whether the federal government was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s 
harm. As courts have indicated, in order to ensure that the government 
does not become an insurer of last resort, some element of 
foreseeability is required. In the context of the claim advanced by this 
paper, courts should evaluate proximate cause by determining 
whether clear and convincing evidence suggests that the federal 
government knew or should have known that its actions to combat 
plaintiff’s harm were inadequate or that its inactions would pose a 
significant risk of serious harm that did, in fact, materialize. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Part II summarizes 
the state of the law regarding takings, with an emphasis on physical 
invasions. Part III attempts to concretize the discussion that follows 
and help frame the limits of the paper’s claim by describing three 
scenarios that should succeed according to the takings test proposed 
here and two that should fail. Parts IV–VII proceed through the steps 
                                                 
37 See Jan G. Laitos, The Role of Causation When Determining the Proper Defendant in a 
Takings Lawsuit, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1181, 1183 (2012) (“The law surrounding this 
causation requirement, though commonly litigated, is unsettled and therefore uncertain.”). 
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a plaintiff must take to succeed in an inverse condemnation claim 
against the United States government. First, plaintiff must show 
exactly what the United States government has done to promote 
climate change effects such as sea level rise, increased chance of 
flooding by storm surge, and more frequent wildfires due to drought 
and heat wave. Thus, Part IV attempts a comprehensive recounting of 
the federal government’s affirmative actions—particularly in 
supporting the fossil fuel industry—that have promoted global 
warming. Part V lays out a non-exhaustive list of constitutional and 
statutory duties—some more specific and others more general—that 
various entities of the United States government incur to combat and 
adapt to particular climate change effects. Part VI explains why 
governmental inaction in certain circumstances can lead to takings 
liability. Part VII revisits the five-factor test suggested supra and 
gives an extended treatment to foreseeability and causation.  
 
II. THE TAKINGS TEST FOR PHYSICAL INVASIONS 
 
The Fifth Amendment reads: “nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”38 It limits the power 
of the United States government to invade private property rights. 
Today, takings are generally divided into two buckets: physical and 
regulatory.  
Takings jurisprudence initially recognized only physical 
takings that arose as the result of the government’s exercising its 
power of eminent domain.39 As such, two quintessential physical 
takings occur when the government “directly appropriates private 
property for its own use,”40 or “physically occupie[s] the property and 
exclude[s] the owner.”41 Whenever the government affects a 
                                                 
38 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
39 See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY 688 (5th ed. 2017); Frank I. Michelman, Property, 
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 
80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184 (1967) (“At one time it was commonly held that, in the absence 
of explicit expropriation, a compensable ‘taking’ could occur only through physical 
encroachment and occupation.”). 
40 Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2425 (2015). 
41 SINGER supra note 39, at 688. 
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permanent, physical occupation of private property, that occupation 
is a per se physical taking.42 Regulatory takings occur when a 
government regulation or statute “goes too far” by causing a “certain 
magnitude” of diminution in a particular property’s value.43 In 
determining whether a regulation has gone “too far,” courts typically 
consider the regulation’s economic impact on the affected parcel, the 
regulation’s interference with the owner’s reasonable, investment-
backed expectations, and the character of the government’s action.44 
Some today believe that the distinction between physical and 
regulatory takings is arbitrary.45 Still, courts employ the distinction.46 
This paper focuses especially on the case of a physical taking, but the 
paper’s claim may be extended to a regulatory taking analysis. 
Permanent physical occupations are “the most serious form of 
invasion of an owner’s property interests.”47 For example, Professor 
Michelman explained: 
 
[C]ourts . . . never deny compensation for a 
physical takeover. The one incontestable case 
for compensation (short of formal 
expropriation) seems to occur when the 
government deliberately brings it about that its 
agents, or the public at large, ‘regularly’ use, 
or ‘permanently’ occupy, space or a thing 
which theretofore was understood to be under 
private ownership. This may be true although 
the invasion is practically trifling from the 
                                                 
42 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (“[A] 
permanent physical occupation . . . is a taking without regard to the public interests that it 
may serve.”). 
43 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-15 (1922). 
44 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
45 See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 
101 (2012) (“[U]nder current takings law, a physical occupation with trivial economic 
consequences gets full compensation. In contrast, major regulatory initiatives rarely require a 
penny in compensation for millions of dollars in economic losses.”). 
46 Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1939 (2017) (discussing the distinction in the first 
paragraph of the Court’s most recent takings case). 
47 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435. 
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owner’s point of view.48 
 
One of the oldest and most well-settled examples of a physical taking 
by means of physical occupation occurs when the government causes 
a flood of private property. For instance, in Pumpelly v. Green Bay & 
Mississippi Canal Co., the Court found a taking when the government 
allowed construction of a dam that permanently flooded plaintiff’s 
property with backwater, “so as to effectually destroy or impair its 
usefulness.”49 The Court has often reaffirmed such an 
interpretation.50 In addition, government-induced flooding need not 
be permanent to constitute a taking.51 For example, in Ark. Game, the 
Court found that the Corps’ repeated, temporary flooding of 
plaintiff’s property took plaintiff’s property unconstitutionally.52  
 More generally, the government appropriates property 
unconstitutionally when it either causes the property to be 
uninhabitable,53 or forecloses the property’s reasonable, intended use 
even if “the enjoyment and use of the land are not completely 
destroyed.”54 For example, in United States v. Causby, military 
airplanes regularly flew over plaintiff’s home and chicken farm at 
such a low altitude that plaintiffs became fearful themselves, and 
some of their chickens were also so fearful that they flew into the 
walls of the outbuildings in which they were kept and killed 
themselves.55 The Court held that this intrusion, while not a physical 
occupation, had constituted a taking of an easement of flight on 
                                                 
48 Michelman, supra note 39, at 1184–85. 
49 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1871) (“It remains true that where real estate is actually invaded by 
superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial 
structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking.”). 
50 See, e.g., United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917). 
51 See Ark. Game, 568 U.S. at 34. 
52 Id. at 26. 
53 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261–62 (1946) (agreeing that a government 
action that renders private property uninhabitable is a taking); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 
277 U.S. 183, 188–89 (1928) (holding that irregular zoning on a small part of a large parcel 
that rendered the entire parcel unsuitable for residential purposes was a taking). 
54 See Ark. Game, 568 U.S. at 33 (noting that takings claim could succeed when government 
action established “a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the 
land.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
55 Causby, 328 U.S. at 258–59. 
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plaintiff’s property.56 
 Some of the most visible and easily foreseeable consequences 
of climate change will be physical invasions of private property that 
leave those properties uninhabitable. For example, sea level rise will 
inundate coastal areas;57 more unpredictable and violent storms will 
result in storm surges;58 and increased drought and heat wave will 
induce wildfires that raze certain properties to the ground.59 Some—
but not all—of these invasions should be compensable as takings. Part 
III presents three such successful claims and two unsuccessful ones. 
 
III. RESULTING HARM – THREE SUCCESSFUL SCENARIOS AND 
TWO UNSUCCESSFUL SCENARIOS 
 
The government cannot be held liable for every flood from 
sea level rise or storm surge, or every wildfire that follows extreme 
drought or heat wave. However, it should be liable for some. The 
federal government has contributed substantially to global GHG 
emissions,60 see infra Part IV, and various federal entities bear rather 
specific duties to respond to climate change effects, see infra Part V. 
Thus, when a particular federal entity knew or should have known 
that its actions were inadequate or its inactions would result in 
significant risk of serious harm, see infra Part VII, the federal entity 
may be liable for a taking. This set of claims is limited, as illustrated 
by the following five scenarios. In each, plaintiff’s property has been 
                                                 
56 Id. at 264–65. 
57 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 12 (2009) (“Sea-level rise and storm surge place many U.S. coastal areas at increasing 
risk of erosion and flooding.”) (hereinafter “USGCRP REPORT”). 
58 See id. at 89; Extreme Precipitation and Climate Change, CTR FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY 
SOLS., https://www.c2es.org/content/extreme-precipitation-and-climate-change/ (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2018). 
59 See USGCRP REPORT, supra note 57, at 33; Heat Waves and Climate Change, CTR. FOR 
CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., https://www.c2es.org/content/heat-waves-and-climate-change/ 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2018). 
60 In fact, the U.S. military is understood to be the single largest institutional consumer of 
crude oil in the world. See Arthur Neslen, Pentagon to Lose Emissions Exemption Under 
Paris Climate Deal, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/14/pentagon-to-lose-emissions-
exemption-under-paris-climate-deal. 
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rendered physically unusable due to flood or fire, but only the first 
three should lead to a successful claim. 
The first successful scenario relates to sea level rise, the 
climate change effect “for which the greatest levels of scientific 
certainty exist.”61 Plaintiff has built a home on a coastal parcel. In so 
doing, plaintiff reasonably relied on Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA)-prepared flood maps and purchased the 
recommended flood insurance through the FEMA-administered 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). However, sea level rise 
affecting this coastal land has accelerated in the last ten years. During 
this time, FEMA has neither updated the flood maps nor adjusted the 
insurance. As a result, just one year after plaintiff completes 
construction, the sea level at high tide approaches plaintiff’s front 
door, and the front yard is unusable because it is always sopping 
wet.62 During rain storms, plaintiff’s house often floods. 
In this scenario, the federal government will be liable for a 
taking because the five factors of this paper’s proposed test are 
satisfied. Plaintiff’s investment-backed expectations were reasonable 
because plaintiff relied on FEMA’s flood maps and NFIP program 
when building. The federal government caused plaintiff’s harm 
because it either knew or should have known—under 42 U.S.C. 
4101(e), FEMA is required to reassess its flood maps every five 
years—that its flood maps were outdated and so posed a significant 
risk of serious harm. Finally, plaintiff’s property here is arguably 
uninhabitable and, inarguably, plaintiff’s reasonable and intended use 
of the land is foreclosed because of the flooding by sea level rise. 
The second successful scenario relates to flooding by storm 
surge from repeated storms in a place that has not traditionally 
experienced such storms. For example, imagine that Hurricane Sandy 
in 2012—which flooded coastal areas in New York City,63 causing 
                                                 
61
 PEEL, supra note 31, at 155; see also CLIMATE CHANGE: EVIDENCE AND CAUSES, supra 
note 2, at 16 (reporting that global sea level rise in the last two decades has been about 0.12 
inches per year and that the overall observed rise since 1901 is eight inches). 
62 Cf. Gertner, supra note 14. 
63 See Matthew Bloch et al., Surveying the Destruction Caused by Hurricane Sandy, N.Y. 
TIMES http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2012/1120-sandy/survey-of-the-flooding-in-
new-york-after-the-hurricane.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2018). 
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tens of billions of dollars of damage64—was followed by nearly 
identical storms in 2014 and 2016. Also imagine that FEMA did not 
update New York City’s flood maps following any of the three events. 
This is not unrealistic: FEMA is just now, in the beginning of 2018, 
commencing to redraw New York City’s flood maps taking into 
account the effects of Hurricane Sandy.65  
After the event in 2016, a plaintiff whose property is not in a 
high-risk flood zone yet was still flooded in each event—2012, 2014, 
and 2016—would be able to bring a successful inverse condemnation 
claim against the federal government and FEMA, in particular, for its 
failure to update the flood maps (as in scenario one). Plaintiff’s 
investment-backed expectations are reasonable because plaintiff still 
lives in a low-risk flood zone according to FEMA. The 2016 
hurricane was foreseeable to the federal government: the event 
regularly recurred, and scientists and climatologists emphasized that 
climate change was likely responsible due to rising Atlantic Ocean 
surface temperatures. The federal government caused the extent of 
the damage because it knew or should have known that its failure to 
update New York City’s flood maps after multiple of the same, 
recurring events would lead to significant risk of serious harm. 
The third successful scenario regards a wildfire that begins on 
federal land—in a region that has become increasingly plagued by 
severe drought and extreme heat wave in the past twenty years66—
and spreads onto adjacent private property, which happens to be a 
poor, low-income neighborhood. Multiple homes are burned to the 
ground. This scenario is a present concern for some property owners 
in California, and that concern will only grow as levels of drought 
                                                 
64 See Fast Facts: Hurricane Costs, NOAA, https://coast.noaa.gov/states/fast-
facts/hurricane-costs.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2018). 
65 David Chen, In New York, Drawing Flood Maps Is a ‘Game of Inches’, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/07/nyregion/new-york-city-flood-maps-
fema.html.  
66
 Climate Change Indicators: Wildfires, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/climate-change-indicators-wildfires (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2018) (noting that the “extent of area burned by wildfires each year appears to have 
increased since the 1980s”); see also CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS, supra note 4, at 11 
(indicating that nine of the ten years with the largest acreage burned since 1983 have occurred 
since 2000). 
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increase in many places across the United States.67 The federal 
entities responsible for monitoring firefighting on federal lands—the 
Forest Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Land 
Management, and FEMA—were fully aware of the drought and heat 
conditions, and so it knew or should have known that the threat of 
wildfire was high.  
As a result, pursuant to its statutory duties to take firefighting 
measures in these circumstances, one of those entities endeavored to 
solve the problem. In accordance with scientific guidance, the federal 
entity planned a controlled burn and mechanical thinning in the forest 
at issue. However, a bureaucratic morass slowed the project for six 
months, after which time the project simply fell through the cracks, 
even though scientists and climatologists repeatedly warned that a 
wildfire would strike imminently. A year or two later, the devastating 
wildfire strikes. These plaintiffs would succeed against the instant 
federal entity because the entity actually knew that its failure to use 
appropriated funds for adequate firefighting to protect lands adjacent 
to federal land would cause significant risk of serious harm.  
In the first unsuccessful scenario, a category four hurricane 
hits Seattle in 2019 and floods numerous properties along the 
shoreline. These owners did not buy flood insurance through NFIP 
because FEMA’s flood maps indicated that there was little to no flood 
risk in Seattle. FEMA’s flood maps looked as they did because 
hurricanes almost never strike the United States’ west coast due to 
low Pacific Ocean surface temperatures,68 and, anyway, the storm 
was category one until very close to shore. Neither climatologists and 
scientists nor recent weather patterns suggested that Seattle was in 
                                                 
67 Drought and Climate Change, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., 
https://www.c2es.org/content/drought-and-climate-change/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) 
(displaying a graphic indicating that northern Texas and western Oklahoma have recently 
experienced unusually extreme drought); Warming Climate Is Deepening California 
Drought, COLUMBIA UNIV.: THE EARTH INST. (Aug. 20, 2015), 
http://www.earth.columbia.edu/articles/view/3258 (noting that rising temperatures drive 
ground moisture into the air, thus making the ground better fuel for wildfires); CLIMATE 
CHANGE INDICATORS, supra note 4, at 8 (finding that from 2000 to 2015, 20-70% of U.S. land 
area experienced abnormally dry conditions).  
68 Why Do Hurricanes Hit the East Coast of the U.S. But Never The West Coast, SCI. AM., 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-do-hurricanes-hit-the-east-coast-of-the-u-s-
but-never-the-west-coast/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2018). 
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danger from such a hurricane.  
In this scenario, if plaintiffs along Seattle’s coastline brought 
an inverse condemnation claim against FEMA for its role in 
encouraging them through flood maps to build where they did, these 
claims should fail. First, a preponderance of the evidence does not 
suggest that climate change caused this hurricane; the hurricane did 
not follow a pattern associated with climate change, it surprised 
scientists, and it occurred in an area unaccustomed to such storms. 
Second, and relatedly, FEMA simply did not know and should not 
have known that this storm would strike when and where it did. The 
federal government cannot insure all flood victims. 
 In the second unsuccessful scenario, recall the facts of the 
third successful scenario supra. Now, though, imagine that after 
planning to undertake a controlled burn and mechanical thinning, 
rather than being slowed by bureaucratic morass and sidetracked by 
other projects, the governmental agency actually did—in accordance 
with the suggestion of climatologists and scientists—undertake a 
controlled burn and mechanical thinning to make the forest less 
susceptible to wildfire. Still, a wildfire strikes the following year. In 
this situation, a court should inquire into the adequacy of the federal 
entity’s actions. But, if they were adequate and taken in good faith, 
the federal entity should not be liable because after the controlled burn 
the government did not know, nor should it have known, its actions 
would leave the adjacent landowners at significant risk of serious 
harm; in fact, it would be reasonable for the federal government to 
think the opposite: that its actions mitigated the risk of serious harm 
through wildfire. Courts must not deter good faith governmental 
efforts at climate change adaptation. 
 
IV. OFFICIAL ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
THAT HAVE PROMOTED GLOBAL WARMING AND BROUGHT 
ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
Through its long history of regulating the transportation and 
electricity-generation sectors, the federal government set the rules of 
the game in favor of fossil fuels, the burning of which accounts for 
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the lion’s share of the United States’ GHG emissions. When the 
United States government began to learn about climate change in the 
1970s, it continued to favor the fossil fuel industry while taking 
virtually no action to address climate change.69 Almost all action 
amounted to funding research rather than mitigation or adaptation.70 
Only recently has the federal government made a genuine effort to 
mitigate and adapt to climate change, but President Trump has 
already rolled back an extraordinary number of those efforts,71 and he 
will no doubt persist in his efforts.72 Section IV.A infra describes the 
federal government’s policies regarding climate change as an 
environmental concern, and Section IV.B infra offers an account of 
the federal government’s actions in the transportation and electricity-
generation sectors. 
 
A. The United States government’s policies on climate change 
In the 1970s Congress passed the most important laws 
governing pollution and our environment, such as the National 
                                                 
69 Note the implication: both Democrats and Republicans are at fault. Control of the White 
House has been shared equally since the late 1970s, and Congress has shifted often, too. 
Democrats have held both the White House and Congress for eight years and Republicans for 
six (before Trump). See BAILEY, supra note 7, at 41–43. 
70 While funding research is important—and continues today apace—the funds committed 
are insufficient, and urgent action is required. See THE LONG THAW, supra note 11, at 20 
(“[A]bout 2 billion dollars per year are being spent on climate change research, 50% of this 
in the United States.” This “amounts to only about 5% of the profits from the Exxon Mobil 
Oil Company.”). 
71 Lisa Friedman and Brad Plumer, E.P.A. Announces Repeal of Major Obama-Era Carbon 
Emissions Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017 
/10/09/climate/clean-power-plan.html (repealing the Clean Power Plan).  
72 Trump has not succeeded in all his desires. For example, his tax bill left subsidies for 
renewables largely intact. See Brad Plumer, Tax Bill Largely Preserves Incentives for Wind 
and Solar Power, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017 
/12/16/climate/tax-bill-wind-solar.html. Further, FERC rejected his plans to promote coal. 
See Trump Plan to Boost Coal and Nuclear Power Gets Rejected, CBS NEWS (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-plan-to-boost-coal-and-nuclear-power-gets-
rejected/. 
102 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 26 
 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),73 the Clean Air Act (CAA),74 the 
Clean Water Act (CWA),75 and the Endangered Species Act (ESA).76 
But these laws had mostly to do with pollution and conservation, not 
climate change.77 The last significant environmental law of any kind 
was the CAA Amendments of 1990. Subsequently, the executive 
branch and environmental groups have attempted to retrofit old 
statutes—the CAA, in particular78—to deal with climate change head 
on, or more obliquely.79 The most recent attempt to pass a climate 
change bill—a GHG cap-and-trade measure—failed in 2010.80  
The United States government has almost certainly been 
aware of anthropogenic climate change since the mid-1970s.81 In 
1976, a congressional committee began conducting research on 
climate change,82 and Congress passed a series of laws—including 
the National Climate Program Act of 197883—in the ensuing years 
that appropriated funds for such research.84 President Carter 
mentioned anthropogenic climate change in a public speech in 
1979.85 And in 1980, a Senate Committee held the first ever 
congressional hearing devoted solely to climate change.86  
                                                 
73 See 43 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (2012). NEPA also created the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ), intended as the environmental equivalent of the Council of Economic 
Advisors.  
74 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2012). 
75 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2012). 
76 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2012) 
77 RICHARD L. REVESZ AND JACK LIENKE, STRUGGLING FOR AIR: POWER PLANTS AND THE 
“WAR ON COAL” 116 (2016). 
78 For example, President Obama’s CPP was based on little-used CAA § 111(d). 
79 See, e.g., PEEL, supra note 31, at 71–78 (highlighting in particular “actions under NEPA 
and the ESA”). 
80 See BREWER, supra note 4, at 157–70 (detailing the journey of the Waxman-Markey Bill 
as it passed the House but failed in the Senate). 
81 See infra at Section VII.C for a more in-depth recitation of what the government knew and 
when. 
82 BAILEY, supra note 7, at 47. 
83 15 U.S.C. § 2901 et seq. (2012). The Act’s purpose was “to establish a national climate 
program that will assist the Nation and the world to understand and respond to natural and 
man-induced climate processes and their implications.” 15 U.S.C. § 2902 (2012).  
84 BAILEY, supra note 7, at 47. 
85 Id. at 50. 
86 Id. at 51. 
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While President Reagan was unfriendly to climate change 
sympathizers,87 government-sponsored research continued, and 
evidence of anthropogenic climate change’s dangers amassed.88 But 
no action followed.89 This tension between increasing scientific 
consensus and political nonchalance or intransigence—the “growing 
divergence between . . . scientists and administration officials”90—
became a recurring theme. Following the 1986 midterms, Congress 
instructed the EPA and State Department to develop a climate change 
policy and report their findings to Congress.91 Due to the law’s 
publicity and an unusually hot summer, both candidates in the 1988 
presidential race referenced climate change.92 Candidate Bush 
promised action.93 
 But President Bush walked back Candidate Bush’s 
enthusiasm. The only climate change action forthcoming was 
increased funding for research.94 While early signals had been good,95 
                                                 
87 OTIS L. GRAHAM, JR., PRESIDENTS AND THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENT 282 (2015) 
(remarking that in his first week, Reagan halved CEQ’s staff and “ordered the removal of the 
solar panels Jimmy Carter had placed on the White House roof”); BAILEY, supra note 7, at 52 
(noting that Reagan repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, proposed cutting climate research 
budgets.) 
88 BAILEY, supra note 7, at 52–53 (explaining that an EPA report in 1983 was the “first time 
a government agency had stated that climate change posed a real threat rather than a 
theoretical one”). 
89 Reagan and some in his administration had no interest in climate change. EPA 
Administrator Anne Burford and Interior Secretary James Watt, for example, “obstructed the 
implementation of laws, reduced budgets, and sided with business interests in disputes over 
public lands, mining, waste disposal, and a range of other environmental issues.” See id. at 
52. 
90 Id. at 54. 
91 Id. (describing the Global Climate Protection Act of 1987). 
92 Id. at 54–56. 
93 Id. at 6 (reporting that Candidate Bush said: “Those who think we are powerless to do 
anything about the ‘greenhouse effect’ are forgetting about the ‘White House effect’”). 
94 For example, the United States Global Change Research Act of 1990—which established 
the U.S. Global Change Research Program—and the Energy Policy Act of 1992 both boosted 
research into climate change and attempted “to promote development of alternative energy 
sources.” See id. at 56–59. Note that the 1990 CAA Amendments were substantial, but, again, 
they regarded traditional air pollution, not global warming. 
95 Secretary of State James Baker in 1989 told an IPCC Working Group that the United States 
“can probably not afford to wait until all of the uncertainties have been resolved before we 
act.” Id. at 56–57. In addition, Bush supported carbon sinks in the form of trees and in his 
first budget, “he requested $175 million to plant a billion trees per year.” Id. at 59. 
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internal conflict within the Bush administration—particularly 
between the EPA, which wanted to address climate change, and the 
Office of Management and Budget, which did not96—stifled any 
ambitious attempts. In addition, President Bush deliberately framed 
climate change in linguistically uncertain terms so as to justify 
inaction.97 Beginning in 1992, the United States joined the 
international movement to address climate change by joining the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).98 Still, Congress and President Bush made clear that they 
opposed mandatory GHG emission limits on America. 
 Under President Clinton, whose vice president and several 
cabinet members were environmentalists,99 the federal government 
also did not meaningfully combat climate change. Rather, small steps 
and expansive rhetoric were the norm.100 In 1997, the United States 
signed the Kyoto Protocol, which committed developed countries to 
binding emissions limits but exempted developing countries. 
However, the United States was not legally bound by the Kyoto 
Protocol.101 In fact, the Senate declared before negotiations began—
in a July 1997 Resolution that passed 95–0—that it would not approve 
such a treaty.102  
 The second set of Bush years were also marked by hostility to 
climate change science and “efforts to abrogate international 
obligations.”103 For example, the United States withdrew from the 
Kyoto Protocol officially,104 and President Bush obstructed the EPA 
from publishing proof of anthropogenic climate change, such as by 
urging the removal of references to “climate change” or “global 
                                                 
96 Id. at 57, 60.  
97 Id. at 60–61. 
98 See id. at 56; infra Section VII.C contains a further discussion of the UNFCCC. 
99 GRAHAM, supra note 87, at 311; BAILEY, supra note 7, at 65. 
100 For example, Clinton issued Executive Orders requiring agencies to purchase more clean-
fuel cars, see Exec. Order No. 12,844, 58 Fed. Reg. 21,885 (Apr. 21, 1993), and energy-
efficient computers, see Exec. Order No. 12,845, 58 Fed. Reg. 21,887 (Apr. 21, 1993). 
101 EMILY C. BARBOUR, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON CLIMATE CHANGE: SELECTED 
LEGAL QUESTIONS 10 (2010); REVESZ, supra note 77, at 122. 
102 BAILEY, supra note 7, at 78. 
103 Id. at 87. 
104 Id. at 93. 
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warming” from official governmental reports.105 Some believed that 
high-profile, extreme weather events (e.g., Hurricane Katrina) had 
been caused in part by climate change,106 and so Bush mentioned 
climate change during the 2007 State of the Union,107 issued a couple 
of relevant Executive Orders,108 and supported a law establishing 
fuel-efficiency requirements for automobiles.109 All the while 
research funding continued.110 Meanwhile, in Massachusetts, the 
Supreme Court required the EPA to regulate GHGs under the CAA if 
it found that GHGs endangered public health and welfare.111 
Outrageously, White House officials responded by preventing the 
EPA from making the inevitable endangerment finding.112 
 President Obama featured climate change during his 
campaign,113 and he appointed environmentalists and serious 
scientists to high posts in his cabinet.114 A few days after his 
inauguration, Obama issued two important memoranda regarding 
fuel-efficiency standards,115 and—following Massachusetts—the 
                                                 
105 The Bush administration was engaged in a “systematic attempt to interfere in the word of 
climate scientists within the federal government.” Id. at 97–98. 
106 Id. at 102. 
107 George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 2007), https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070123-2.html. 
108 Exec. Order No. 13,423, 72 Fed. Reg. 3919 (Jan. 26, 2007) (requiring federal agencies to 
“improve energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas emissions”); Exec. Order. No. 13,432, 
72 Fed. Reg. 27717 (May 16, 2007) (declaring it United States policy to protect the 
environment from automobile GHG emissions). 
109 BAILEY, supra note 7, at 106 (describing Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007). 
110 See id. at 94 (establishing the United States Climate Change Research Initiative in 2001). 
111 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533 (“If EPA makes a finding of endangerment, the [CAA] 
requires the Agency to regulate emissions of the deleterious pollutant from new motor 
vehicles.”); REVESZ, supra note 77, at 122–23. 
112 REVESZ, supra note 77, at 124–25 (detailing how OIRA refused to open EPA’s email 
containing the draft regulation of the endangerment finding and instead took the position that 
“the ninety-day review period for agency regulations was triggered when the email containing 
a draft regulation was opened, not when it was received”). 
113 This is in contrast to Obama’s Republican opponents. At the Republican debate on 
December 12, 2007, the Republican presidential candidates were asked to raise their hands if 
they believed in climate change. No one raised his hand. See BAILEY, supra note 7, at 118. 
114 BAILEY, supra note 7, at 121; GRAHAM, supra note 87, at 339 (commenting that Obama 
appointed, for example: Steven Chu, Nobel-prize winning physicist, as Secretary of Energy; 
Carol Browner, EPA Administrator under Clinton, as his climate “czar”; and Lisa Jackson, 
New Jersey’s Commissioner of Environmental Protection, as EPA Administrator). 
115 BAILEY, supra note 7, at 122 (noting that the first directed Department of Transportation 
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EPA quickly made an endangerment finding and issued a new fuel 
efficiency rule.116 In the stimulus bill of 2009, between $30 and $90 
billion went to support clean energy projects.117 And further 
memoranda and Executive Orders instructed federal agencies to 
move towards sustainability.118 After multiple unsuccessful attempts 
to pass a comprehensive GHG cap-and-trade bill in years prior,119 the 
111th Congress came closest, but the bill failed in the Senate in 
2010.120 Still, Obama assured the world that by 2050, the United 
States would reduce its GHG emissions to 83 percent below 2005 
levels.121 
 Following his reelection, Obama explained to the nation the 
imperative for fast action,122 and then outlined in his Climate Action 
Plan of 2013 the executive avenues he would pursue to mitigate 
                                                 
to finalize regulations stemming from the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act, and 
the second instructed EPA to reconsider California’s waiver request regarding national fuel-
efficiency standards).  
116 See John M. Broder, U.S. Issues Limits on Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Cars, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/science/earth/02emit.html 
(describing the Tailpipe Rule). Both the endangerment finding and Tailpipe Rule were upheld 
in court. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (2014). 
117 See, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, H.R. 1, 111th Cong. (2009); 
BAILEY, supra note 7, at 126; Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet, (Feb. 
25, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/25/fact-sheet-
recovery-act-made-largest-single-investment-clean-energy. 
118
 PEEL, supra note 31, at 148 (describing Exec. Order 13,514, which required federal 
agencies to detail by June 2012 the adaptation measures they would undertake in their 
operations, programs, and policies); CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., CLIMATE CHANGE 
ADAPTATION 2 (Feb. 2012); BAILEY, supra note 7, at 125. 
119 BREWER, supra note 4, at 152–53 (recounting the 108th, 109th, and 110th Congresses’ tries). 
120 Id. at 157–70. For commentary on why the bill failed, see REVESZ, supra note 77, at 126 
(noting that cap-and-trade was not a novel approach—it had succeeded in the Acid Rain 
Deposition Program in the 1990s); BAILEY, supra note 7, at 8 (positing that the wider 
economic depression in the U.S. put Democratic Senators from “coal states” between a rock 
and a hard place); GRAHAM, supra note 87, at 345 (proposing an alternative explanation that 
the bill was “festooned with unpredictable complications some members did not pretend to 
understand”). 
121 See GRAHAM, supra note 87, at 347. 
122 Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 2013) (declaring in his Second Inaugural that 
“we will respond to the threat of climate change, knowing that the failure to do so would 
betray our children and future generations”); Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Feb. 
12, 2013) (warning that “if Congress won’t act soon to protect future generations, I will”). 
2019]  107 
 
climate change and adapt to its effects.123 Shortly thereafter, the EPA 
rolled out its Clean Power Plan (CPP), intended to curtail GHG 
emissions from existing coal-fired power plants, a major exclusion 
from the CAA.124 The CPP—along with the Transport Rule125 and 
the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards126—were attacked as Obama’s 
“War on Coal.”127 A further Executive Order explicitly instructed 
federal agencies to focus on adaptation and “preparedness 
planning.”128 Finally, Obama helped engineer the landmark Paris 
Climate Agreement in 2015.129 
 Under President Trump, the federal government has changed 
course. Before assuming the presidency, Trump often tweeted that 
climate change was a hoax.130 As of June 1, 2017, by one 
commentator’s assessment, Trump had tweeted climate change 
skepticism 115 times.131 As president, Trump has appointed cabinet 
members who deny that climate change exists,132 and some federal 
                                                 
123 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (June 
2013); BAILEY, supra note 7, at 143; PEEL, supra note 31, at 148 (detailing the plan’s 
adaptation steps). 
124 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (hereinafter “the CPP”). The CPP was 
only one of the EPA’s efforts. For more, see BREWER, supra note 4, at 174–75. 
125 Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone 
and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011).  
126 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired 
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired 
Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-
Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9403 (Feb. 16, 2012).  
127 REVESZ, supra note 77, at 3. 
128 PEEL, supra note 31, at 148. 
129 John D. Sutter et al., Obama: Climate Agreement ‘Best Chance We Have’ To Save the 
Planet, CNN (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/12/world/global-climate-
change-conference-vote/.  
130 See, e.g., Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, (Mar. 28, 2012, 11:43 am), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/185074709111644160?lang=en (“Global 
warming has been proven to be a canard repeatedly over and over again.”); Donald J. Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:15 am), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385?lang=en (“The concept of 
global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-
competitive.”). 
131 See supra note 7.  
132 Scott Pruitt—the former Administrator of Trump’s EPA—had received almost $300,000 
in campaign contributions from the fossil fuel industry and sued the EPA repeatedly as 
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agencies have erased the phrase “climate change” from their 
websites.133 More formally, Trump has rolled back scores of 
consequential rules and initiatives focused on climate change 
mitigation or adaptation.134 In one of his first official acts, Trump 
ordered federal agencies to expedite environmental reviews of fossil 
fuel infrastructure projects, such as the Dakota Access Pipeline.135 
And later in 2017, Trump revoked an Obama-era order that required 
federal agencies to consider sea level rise and flood projections when 
planning agency actions.136 Perhaps most importantly, Trump 
ordered the EPA to review the CPP,137 and, since then, the EPA has 
proposed its repeal and replacement.138 
                                                 
Oklahoma’s Attorney General. See Sammy Roth, Scott Pruitt, Trump’s EPA Pick, Rejects 
Climate Science and Fights For Fossil Fuels, USA TODAY (Dec. 9, 2016), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/environment/2016/12/09/scott-pruitt-trumps-epa-
pick-rejects-climate-science-and-fights-fossil-fuels/95200658/. Additionally, he does not 
believe that CO2 is a primary contributor to global warming. Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Chief 
Doubts Consensus View of Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/us/politics/epa-scott-pruitt-global-warming.html. Nor 
does he believe that global warming “necessarily is a bad thing.” See Oliver Milman, EPA 
Head Scott Pruitt Says Global Warming May Help ‘Humans Flourish’, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 
7, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/feb/07/epa-head-scott-pruitt-
says-global-warming-may-help-humans-flourish. Rick Perry—the Secretary of Trump’s 
DOE—has also denied that anthropogenic CO2 is the primary contributor to climate change. 
Tom DiChristopher, Energy Secretary Rick Perry Says CO2 Is Not the Main Driver of Climate 
Change, CNBC (June 19, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/19/energy-sec-rick-perry-
says-co2-is-not-the-main-driver-of-climate-change.html. 
133 Coral Davenport, How Much Has ‘Climate Change’ Been Scrubbed from Federal 
Websites? A Lot., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
01/10/climate/climate-change-trump.html?rref=climate; Lisa Friedman, E.P.A. Scrubs a 
Climate Website of ‘Climate Change’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/climate/epa-climate-change.html (examining EPA’s 
website in particular). 
134 See supra note 17. To keep further track, see HARVARD LAW SCH. ENVTL. LAW PROGRAM, 
http://environment.law.harvard.edu/POLICY-INITIATIVE/REGULATORY-ROLLBACK-
TRACKER/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2018); COLUM. LAW SCH. SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE 
CHANGE LAW, http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-deregulation-tracker/ (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2018). 
135 Exec. Order No. 13,766, 82 Fed. Reg. 8657 (Jan. 24, 2017).  
136
 Exec. Order No. 13,807, 82 Fed. Reg. 40,463 (Aug. 15, 2017).  
137 Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017).  
138 The process is now in notice-and-comment. See EPA Issues Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking to Replace Clean Power Plan, COLUM. LAW SCH. SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE 
CHANGE LAW (Dec. 28, 2017), http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/climate-deregulation-
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B. The United States government promoted fossil fuels—and GHG 
emissions—in the transportation and electricity-generation sectors 
 In the United States, GHG emissions from two economic 
sectors—transportation and electricity-generation—are responsible 
for about two-thirds of the country’s cumulative total emissions.139 
The two sectors rely heavily on burning fossil fuels for energy.140 
That reliance is the result of a long history of federal regulations that 
have favored and incentivized fossil fuel companies: The success of 
the fossil fuel industry was not written in the stars.141 Today, among 
dozens of industrialized countries, the United States has the second-
worst effective carbon tax rate: the average is $68.40 per metric ton 
of CO2, but the United States imposes just $6.30.
142 Through 
legislation and regulation, the United States government created the 
conditions—incentivizing massive infrastructure and capital 
investments—for these industries to thrive. 
 
1. Transportation 
 
a. Highway infrastructure 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States 
                                                 
tracker/epa-issues-advance-notice-of-proposed-rulemaking-to-replace-clean-power-plan/. 
139
 See CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS, supra note 4, at 13 (reporting that since 1990 
electricity has produced 31% and transportation 26%).  
140
 Fossil fuels are abundant, cheap, and reliable. For a full-throated defense of fossil fuel 
use in the past and advocating for accelerated use of them into the future, see ALEX EPSTEIN, 
THE MORAL CASE FOR FOSSIL FUELS (2014). 
141 Note that state and local governments, too, are responsible for portions of energy 
regulation. See, e.g., State & Local Government, DEP’T ENERGY, https://energy.gov/energy-
economy/state-local-government (last visited Feb. 26, 2018). However, the federal 
government’s unique role in regulating interstate commerce makes it the most responsible 
party in electricity regulation. 
142
 See Eduardo Porter, In Energy Taxes, Tools to Help Tackle Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/30/business/energy-tax-is-underused-tool-
in-climate-change-fight.html; Brad Plumer, The U.S. Has Some of the Lowest Energy Taxes 
in the Developed World, THE WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2013) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/31/how-the-world-taxes-fossil-
fuels-in-three-charts/?utm_term=.cada33754636. 
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government has financed a massive interstate highway system and 
incentivized people to use it. As a result, Americans use by far the 
most vehicles of any people in the world in both absolute and per 
capita terms—there is about one car per person in the United States.143 
Only in 1907 did the Supreme Court confirm that the federal 
government could “construct interstate highways.”144 Ford’s Model 
T hit the market in 1908,145 and multiple federal laws subsequently 
provided federal funds for states to build highways.146 But road 
building in the United States did not gain serious steam until the New 
Deal, when it became a major goal of several federal agencies. The 
Works Progress Administration alone oversaw the building of 
650,000 miles of road.147 After World War II, Congress further 
funded the fledgling interstate highway system, but progress was slow 
until President Eisenhower in the 1950s prioritized the interstate 
highway system.148 “More than any single action by the government 
since the end of the war, this one would change the face of America,” 
Eisenhower wrote after his presidency.149  
                                                 
143 The United States has by far the most vehicles in the world, in both gross and per capita 
terms. As of 2011, the United States had 239.8 million cars, for 23.6% of the world’s total. 
China had the second-most cars in absolute terms, with 78 million, for 7.7%. See Daniel 
Tencer, Number of Cars Worldwide Surpasses 1 Billion, HUFFPOST (Aug. 23, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2011/08/23/car-population_n_934291.html. As of 2014, the 
United States had over 800 vehicles per 1000 people. Canada had the second-most vehicles 
per thousand people, with 656 vehicles. The United States had the same rate in 1976. See Fact 
#962: January 30, 2017 Vehicles Per Capita, DEP’T ENERGY (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://energy.gov/eere/vehicles/fact-962-january-30-2017-vehicles-capita-other-
regionscountries-compared-united-states.  
144 Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24, 35 (1907) (using the Commerce Clause as a basis). 
145 Our History, FORD, https://corporate.ford.com/history.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2018). 
146 See, e.g., Brief History of the Direct Federal Highway Construction Program, DEP’T 
TRANSP. (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/blazer01.cfm (detailing, 
for example, the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916 and the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1921). 
147 Chip Reid, FDR’s New Deal Blueprint for Obama, CBS NEWS (Dec. 14, 2008), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fdrs-new-deal-blueprint-for-obama/. 
148 See, e.g., The Interstate Highway System, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/ 
topics/interstate-highway-system (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (documenting the Federal Aid 
Highway Act of 1956, which called for 41,000 more miles of interstate highways and 
appropriated $25 billion for that purpose from 1957 to 1969); History of the Interstate 
Highway System, DEP’T TRANSP., https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/interstate/history.cfm (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2018). 
149 PETE DAVIES, AMERICAN ROAD: THE STORY OF AN EPIC TRANSCONTINENTAL JOURNEY AT 
THE DAWN OF THE MOTOR AGE 215 (2002). 
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At the same time, the federal government was uninterested in 
funding mass transportation,150 which, by substituting for personal 
vehicle use, is effective in lowering GHG emissions.151 As a result, 
Americans use public transit much less than do people in comparable, 
industrialized countries.152 In 1962, President Kennedy called on 
Congress to establish federal funding for mass transit to limit urban 
sprawl facilitated by the interstate highway system.153 In 1964, 
Congress responded by establishing an agency to provide “financial 
and technical assistance to local public transit systems,”154 but 
funding has been scarce.155 Today, federal funding for public transit 
is one-quarter of that for highway and bridge improvements.156 
 
                                                 
150
 See BAILEY, supra note 7, at 27–28 (“[S]upport for public transportation has also been 
limited in a country with a deeply ingrained ‘car culture’ and cities designed around the . . . 
automobile.”). 
151 See generally The Benefits of Public Transportation, AM. PUB. TRANSP. ASS’N, 
https://www.apta.com/resources/reportsandpublications/documents/greenhouse_brochure.p
df (last visited Dec. 20, 2018). 
152 See TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., MAKING TRANSIT WORK: INSIGHT FROM WESTERN EUROPE, 
CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES – SPECIAL REPORT 257 1 (2001) (finding that in 2001 
public transit was “used for about 10 percent of urban trips in Western Europe, compared 
with about 2 percent in the United States.”); Ralph Buehler, 9 Reasons the U.S. Ended Up So 
Much More Car-Dependent Than Europe, CITYLAB (Feb. 4, 2014), 
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2014/02/9-reasons-us-ended-so-much-more-car-
dependent-europe/8226/ (noting that in 2010, Americans drove on 85% of daily trips, which 
was 20 to 35% more than their European counterparts). 
153
 About FTA, FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., https://www.transit.dot.gov/about-fta (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2018). 
154 See id. (discussing the establishment of the Urban Mass Transit Administration, the 
precursor to today’s Federal Transit Authority, which sits within the DOT).  
155 Since 1993, the Mass Transit Account has received $2.86 per gallon from the $18.4 per 
gallon gas tax. See id. More recently, in 2015, Congress passed five-year transportation 
legislation—the “first long-term transportation funding bill in a decade.” See Brian Usher, 
It’s Great We Finally Have a Transit Funding Bill—But There’s More to Do, WIRED (Dec. 
14, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/12/its-great-we-finally-have-a-transit-funding-bill-
but-theres-more-to-do/. The legislation allocates about $12 billion per year to the Mass 
Transit Account. See Frequently Asked Questions, AM. ROAD & TRANSP. BUILDERS ASS’N, 
https://www.artba.org/about/faq/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (see question “What is the 
federal government’s annual investment in transportation improvements?”). 
156 See id.; but cf. Aarian Marshall, US Cities, Spurned By Washington, Fund Transit 
Themselves, WIRED (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/11/us-cities-spurned-
washington-fund-transit/ (describing cities attempting to fill this perceived gap).  
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b. Favorable treatment for oil and gas companies 
In addition to funding and building America’s interstate 
highways, the United States has encouraged their use by artificially 
suppressing the price of gas that consumers buy at the pumps, giving 
huge tax breaks to oil companies, and granting federal easements for 
oil production and transport. The United States currently imposes a 
federal gas tax of just 18.4 cents per gallon.157 Even including state 
and local gas taxes, the effective rate in the United States ranks near 
the bottom among industrialized countries.158 Initiated in 1932 at one 
cent per gallon, Congress barely increased the gas tax over the 
ensuing decades, even as cars widely proliferated.159 The gas tax was 
last raised in 1993 and is not indexed to inflation.160 Today, 84 percent 
of the gas tax enters a separate fund that pays for repairs to and 
expansions of the interstate highway system.161 In contrast, in many 
European countries, gas taxes siphon into the general revenue fund.162 
 The federal government has favored oil and gas companies 
                                                 
157 See Plumer, supra note 142. At time of writing, there is a possibility that Congress will 
raise the gas tax by 25 cents per gallon to fund President Trump’s proposal for infrastructure 
spending. See Trump Backs 25-Cent-a-Gallon Gasoline Tax Hike: Senator, REUTERS (Feb. 
14, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-infrastructure/trump-backs-25-
cent-a-gallon-gasoline-tax-hike-senator-idUSKCN1FY33T. 
158 Plumer, supra note 142 (noting that the tax averaged across the 50 states is 30.3 cents per 
gallon). Note also that economic experts generally agree that taxing the carbon content of fuel 
more heavily would be perhaps the best way of reducing GHG emissions from automobiles. 
See, e.g., Carbon Tax, IGM FORUM (Dec. 20, 2011), 
http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/carbon-tax. For one such carbon tax proposal, although 
on a scale beyond just the automobile universe, see GILBERT E. METCALF, DESIGNING A 
CARBON TAX TO REDUCE U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (2008).  
159 Ask the Rambler, DEP’T TRANSP., https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/gastax.cfm 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2018). 
160 See Emily Atkin, The Solution to Trump’s Infrastructure Problems: Raise the Gas Tax, 
THE NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 23, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/147042/solution-
trumps-infrastructure-problems-raise-gas-tax. 
161 Ask the Rambler, supra note 159 (explaining that the other 2.86 cents per gallon goes to a 
Mass Transit Account); Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, TAX POLICY CTR., 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-major-federal-excise-taxes-and-
how-much-money-do-they-raise (last visited Dec. 20, 2018). Still, the federal government has 
dipped into general revenue funds to cover the cost of roadway expenditures. See Gasoline 
Tax Hike, supra note 157 (“Congress has transferred nearly $140 billion to the Highway Trust 
Fund since 2008.”). 
162 See Buehler, supra note 152 (emphasizing that in European countries, roadway 
construction competes for funding). 
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through the tax code since the early twentieth century; government-
sanctioned subsidies continue in full force. Today, several large oil 
and gas companies regularly pay either no or negative taxes,163 even 
though they are among the most profitable companies in the United 
States. Most believe that the United States subsidizes oil and gas 
companies at least $4 billion per year,164 but it is possibly much more, 
if one defines “subsidy” more broadly.165 Such government-
sponsored incentives have existed since 1916, when Congress first 
allowed oil and gas companies to deduct their “intangible drilling 
costs” incurred in the first year of exploration.166 In 2015, the United 
States itself estimated that this tax break led to foregone revenue of 
$1.63 billion.167 In 1926, Congress added another loophole—the 
“depletion allowance”—which allowed oil companies to deduct 27.5 
percent of their gross revenues.168 Despite multiple attempts over the 
                                                 
163 Heather Long, America’s 20 Largest Companies on the Tax Overhaul, THE WASH. POST 
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/business/corporations-tax-
cut-gop-tax-bill/?utm_term=.dc9e56b403f7; Patricia Cohen, Profitable Companies, No 
Taxes: Here’s How They Did It, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/business/economy/corporate-tax-report.html (listing 
18 Fortune 500 companies—14 energy companies—that paid no income tax from 2008 to 
2015). 
164 E.g., Robert Rapier, The Surprising Reason That Oil Subsidies Persist: Even Liberals 
Love Them, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource 
/2012/04/25/the-surprising-reason-that-oil-subsidies-persist-even-liberals-love-
them/#6982b1e63279.  
165 See Fossil Fuel Subsidies: Overview, OIL CHANGE INT’L, http://priceofoil.org/fossil-fuel-
subsidies/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (“As of October 2017, Oil Change International 
estimates United States fossil fuel exploration and production subsidies at $20.5 billion 
annually.”). 
166
 See Mark J. Perry & Ryan Alexander, Does the Oil-and-Gas Industry Still Need Tax 
Breaks?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/does-the-oil-and-gas-
industry-still-need-tax-breaks-1479092522; see also Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, 
supra note 161 (“Intangible drilling costs cover the labor, machinery, and materials needed 
for drilling and developing oil and gas wells and coal mines.”).  
167
 See Perry, supra note 166; Alex Park et al., A Brief History of Big Tax Breaks for Oil 
Companies, MOTHERJONES (Apr. 14, 2014) https://www.motherjones.com/politics 
/2014/04/oil-subsidies-energy-timeline/. 
168 See id. (observing that the senator who proposed the allowance settled on 27.5% “because 
we were . . . hogs . . . [and] the odd figure made it appear as though it was scientifically arrived 
at”). 
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years to cabin or repeal the depletion allowance,169 the allowance still 
exists at 15 percent170 and allows virtually all but the biggest oil and 
gas companies to recover their drilling costs.171  
 The significant incentives continue in the present day. In 
1995, for instance, Congress allowed certain oil and gas companies 
to drill in deep federal waters without paying royalties, a decision that 
could have cost the federal government up to $80 billion.172 Still, 
President Trump recently extended allowances for offshore drilling in 
“nearly all United States coastal waters.”173 Even though many oil 
and gas companies already pay far lower than the corporate tax 
rate,174 the recent tax cut will likely gift oil and gas companies a 
further $1 billion.175 Perhaps most disturbingly, Congress opened the 
Alaska National Wildlife Refuge to potential oil exploration in the 
next decade.176 The United States has also supported the oil and gas 
industries by granting federal easements for oil pipelines, such as the 
Dakota Access Pipeline.177 Another such easement will likely be 
                                                 
169 Id. (citing attempts by Presidents Roosevelt (1937), Truman (1950), Kennedy (1960)). 
170 26 U.S.C. § 613(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
171 See Steven Mufson, How Much Do Oil Companies Really Pay In Taxes?, THE WASH. 
POST (May 11, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/how-much-do-
oil-companies-really-pay-in-
taxes/2011/05/11/AF7UNutG_story.html?utm_term=.d8240db43165.  
172 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-369T, OIL AND GAS ROYALTIES: 
ROYALTY RELIEF WILL LIKELY COST THE GOVERNMENT BILLIONS, BUT THE FINAL COSTS 
HAVE YET TO BE DETERMINED: HEARING BEFORE THE S. COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL 
RESOURCES (2007) (statement of Mark E. Gaffigan, Acting Director, Natural Resources and 
Environment). 
173 Lisa Friedman, Trump Moves to Open Nearly All Offshore Waters to Drilling, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/climate/trump-offshore-drilling.html.  
174 See Mufson, supra note 171 (noting that despite the corporate tax rate of 35%, Exxon 
Mobil in 2010 paid under 18% in federal taxes). 
175 See Dino Grandoni, The Energy 202: The GOP Tax Plan Is a Windfall For Oil and Gas 
Industry, THE WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-energy-202/2017/12/21/the-
energy-202-the-gop-tax-plan-is-a-windfall-for-oil-and-gas-
industry/5a3afa4d30fb0469e883fd40/?utm_term=.a40275ea3067. 
176 Elizabeth Harball, Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Battle Ends, But Drilling Not A Given, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/21/572439797/arctic-
national-wildlife-refuge-battle-ends-but-drilling-not-a-given.  
177 Rebecca Hersher, Army Approves Dakota Access Pipeline Route, Paving Way For The 
Project’s Completion, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/07/513951600/army-approves-dakota-
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required for the Keystone XL Pipeline’s new path.178  
 
2. Electricity-generation: coal, natural gas, and renewables 
a. Coal 
Coal, which is mined mostly in Wyoming and Appalachia,179 
still generates the second-largest share of electricity in the United 
States, mostly through coal-fired power plants.180 But the coal 
industry’s market share in the electricity-generating sector has been 
shrinking since the 1980s.181 Government subsidies have long 
encouraged coal mining in the United States, although they are 
somewhat smaller182 and more difficult to quantify183 than those for 
oil.  
Smokestack plumes have long made clear the dirty nature of 
coal-fired power plants.184 Thus, new and modified coal-fired power 
plants are strictly regulated under the CAA. As a result, likely no more 
new coal-fired power plants will be built in the United States.185 Still, 
                                                 
access-pipeline-route-paving-way-for-the-projects-completio. 
178 Mitch Smith, Nebraska Allows Keystone XL Pipeline, But Picks a Different Path, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/us/nebraska-pipeline-
keystone-xl.html. 
179 REVESZ, supra note 77, at 8. 
180 Id. at 9. 
181 See id., for a discussion indicating this trend will likely continue. See also Benjamin 
Storrow, Will the U.S. Ever Build Another Big Coal Plant?, SCI. AM. (Aug. 21, 2017), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/will-the-u-s-ever-build-another-big-coal-plant/; 
Jeff Nesbit, Coal’s Continuing Decline, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/opinion/trump-coal-
decline.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=opinion-c-col-left-region&region=opinion-c-col-left-
region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-left-region. 
182 David Roberts, Friendly Policies Keep US Oil and Coal Afloat Far More Than We 
Thought, VOX (Oct. 7, 2017), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/ 
2017/10/6/16428458/us-energy-subsidies (attributing 20% of federal fossil fuel subsidies to 
coal and 80% to oil and gas). 
183 Jeff Johnson, Long History of U.S. Energy Subsidies, CHEM. & ENG’G NEWS (Dec. 19, 
2011), https://cen.acs.org/articles/89/i51/Long-History-US-Energy-Subsidies.html.  
184 Cf. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper, 240 U.S. 650 (1916) (finding a public nuisance based on 
smokestacks releasing pollutants from copper smelting that drifted across border into 
Georgia). 
185 See Storrow, supra note 181. 
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existing coal-fired power plants are the largest CO2 contributors 
worldwide, and the United States’ coal consumption alone in 2011 
constituted 13 percent of the world’s CO2 emissions.186 The great sin 
of the CAA, then, was exempting existing power plants from its 
coverage.187 
President Obama’s CPP—which required “significant 
reductions in plants’ emission of carbon dioxide”188—was the first 
attempt to regulate these existing plants’ GHG emissions.189 But it 
was short-lived: the Supreme Court stayed the CPP nationwide in 
February 2016.190 President Trump by Executive Order signaled his 
intention to review the CPP,191 and EPA followed suit by proposing 
to repeal it.192 The federal government under President Trump 
continues propping up the dying coal industry.193 For example, 
Trump has encouraged coal mining on federally owned lands,194 the 
effective tax rate for coal remains under one percent, and Wyoming’s 
Power River Basin will continue to receive nearly $1 billion in annual 
subsidies.195 
                                                 
186 Bobby Magill, Coal Plants Lock in 300 Billion Tons of CO2 Emissions, CLIMATE CENT. 
(Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/coal-plants-lock-in-300-billion-tons-
of-co2-emissions-17950.  
187 See REVESZ, supra note 77, at 3. 
188 Id. at 2. In fact, the CPP would have “reduced greenhouse-gas emissions from the power 
sector 32 percent below 2005 levels by 2030.” See Coral Davenport et al., What Is the Clean 
Power Plan, and How Can Trump Repeal It?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/climate/epa-clean-power-plan.html; REVESZ, supra 
note 77, at 151 (delving into the CPP’s details). 
189 See REVESZ, supra note 77, at 4; the CPP, supra note 124. 
190 Adam Liptak and Coral Davenport, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Obama’s Efforts to 
Regulate Coal Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/02/10/us/politics/supreme-court-blocks-obama-epa-coal-emissions-regulations.html.  
191 Exec. Order No. 13,783, supra note 137; Coral Davenport and Alissa J. Rubin, Trump 
Signs Executive Order Unwinding Obama Climate Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/climate/trump-executive-order-climate-change.html. 
192 See Friedman, supra note 71. There is no replacement plan yet. 
193 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Joseph Goffman, Rick Perry’s Anti-Market Plan to Help Coal, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/opinion/rick-perry-coal-
antimarket.html.  
194 Eric Lipton and Barry Meier, Under Trump, Coal Mining Gets New Life on U.S. Lands, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/06/us/politics/under-trump-
coal-mining-gets-new-life-on-us-lands.html. 
195 Emily Atkin, The Tax Bill’s Gift to Big Coal, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 25, 2017), 
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b. Natural Gas 
While still contributing GHGs to the atmosphere, natural gas 
emits only about half as much CO2 as coal in producing the same 
amount of energy.196 As such, natural gas is often seen as a bridge 
between dirty coal and clean renewables. Since 2015, natural gas has 
generated the most electricity in the United States.197 Natural gas did 
not overtake coal sooner in large part because the federal government 
artificially suppressed the gas supply through price controls.198 
Because of the prohibitive expense of building natural gas 
pipelines, there was not a big market for natural gas until the 1920s.199 
Due to high capital expenses, transport of natural gas presented a 
natural monopoly and so Congress enacted a law in 1938 that 
entrusted the Federal Power Commission (FPC) with setting “just and 
reasonable” rates for interstate gas sales.200 A 1954 Supreme Court 
decision expanded the FPC’s regulatory power to the wellhead rate, 
which increased the federal government’s control over the natural gas 
market. 201 But for the next twenty years the FPC kept wellhead rates 
essentially flat, even as demand increased, which artificially 
suppressed gas supply by removing the appropriate incentive for 
developers.202  
Still, by 1970, natural gas’s share of the energy market was 
30 percent, about half of coal’s.203 But supply became spotty in the 
1970s due to the FPC’s artificially low rates, and so natural gas’s 
market share fell to 20 percent.204 Congress attempted in 1978 to 
                                                 
https://newrepublic.com/article/146388/tax-bills-gift-big-coal (Wyoming’s Powder River 
Basin is responsible for about 40% of the country’s coal production). 
196 Jeffrey Ball, The Oil v. Coal Showdown Is Going to the Next Level, THE NEW REPUBLIC 
(Oct. 3, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/119693/fossil-fuel-industry-breaks-and-
attacks-coal.  
197 See REVESZ, supra note 77, at 145. 
198 Id. at 142. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 142–43 (describing The Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq. (2012)). 
201 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954). 
202 REVESZ, supra note 77, at 143. 
203 Id. at 142. 
204 Id. at 143. 
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boost natural gas supply,205 but Congress managed instead (through 
another 1978 law) to restrict demand.206 In 1987, Congress finally 
fixed the problem by repealing the latter law.207 However, only 
recently has the industry skyrocketed due to horizontal drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing (fracking), which have made natural gas cheaper: 
between 2008 and 2013, natural gas prices fell 50 percent.208 And 
today, due to the widespread proliferation of fracking, natural gas has 
overtaken coal as the largest electricity-generating fuel in the United 
States.209  
 
c. Renewables 
Today, renewable sources such as wind, solar, and 
hydropower supply almost 15 percent of our energy.210 Even 15 
percent is a recent development.211 In 1992, Congress for the first 
time issued production tax credits for renewable energy generation, 
as well as for electric cars.212 And in 1993, President Clinton 
proposed a tax on all non-renewable energy sources,213 but the 
proposal did not pass.214 But times changed: in 2008, annual tax 
subsidies for renewable energy sources surpassed those that Congress 
                                                 
205 Paul L. Joskow, Natural Gas: From Shortages to Abundance in the United States, 103 
AM. ECON. REV. 338, 338 (2013) (describing the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978). 
206 REVESZ, supra note 77, at 144 (explaining how Congress, through the Powerplant and 
Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, limited construction of new gas-fired power plants). 
207 Id. (reporting that the latter law was repealed, and thus more gas-fired plants were built). 
208 Id. at 145. 
209 See id.; see also Tim Meko and Laris Karklis, The United States of Oil and Gas, THE 
WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/united-
states-of-oil/ (detailing the recent boom and potential areas of expansion in the future). 
210 See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 18, 2017), 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=92&t=4; DON PHILPOTT, CRITICAL GOVERNMENT 
DOCUMENTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT 137 (2015) (suggesting that with effort, by 2050, about 
80% of our energy could come from renewable sources). 
211 See, e.g., Energy Sources Have Changed Throughout the History of the United States, 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 3, 2013), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=11951.  
212 See Park et al., supra note 167 (describing the Energy Policy Act); Renewable Electricity 
Production Tax Credit, DEP’T ENERGY, https://energy.gov/savings/renewable-electricity-
production-tax-credit-ptc (last visited Dec. 20, 2018).  
213 REVESZ, supra note 77, at 120; BREWER, supra note 4, at 150. 
214 BAILEY, supra note 7, at 69 (noting that, as a compromise, the gas tax was raised slightly). 
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supplied for oil and gas.215 In the stimulus bill of 2009, between $30 
and $90 billion went to “clean energy investments and tax 
incentives.”216 Several times since 2009 the production tax credit has 
been extended.217 And even in the most recent tax bill, subsidies for 
the renewable energy industry survived mostly intact.218 These 
subsidies are popular: traditionally red states, like Texas, are some of 
the largest consumers of renewables and so stand to benefit the most 
from these subsidies.219 The prices of renewable energy promise to 
remain low even if and when federal subsidies do expire.220 
 
IV. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY DUTIES TO MITIGATE GHG EMISSIONS AND ADAPT 
TO THEIR EFFECTS 
 
The Fifth Amendment’s limitation on the federal 
government’s power—“nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation”221—is easily reformulated as a 
constitutional duty not to take private property without paying just 
compensation. For example, recall that the government has a duty to 
pay just compensation for taking private property when it has caused 
that property to be flooded, even temporarily.222 This duty covers 
particular and limited instances of physical invasions in the climate 
change context: some inundations of private property by sea level rise 
and by storm surge, and some destructions by wildfire, for example. 
Determining when the federal government has breached this duty and 
caused the relevant harm is the subject of Section VII.D infra. 
                                                 
215 Park et al., supra note 167. 
216 See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 117. 
217 See Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit, supra note 212. 
218 Grandoni, supra note 175; Plumer, supra note 72.  
219 Ryan Maye Handy, Wind Power Blows Past Coal in Texas, HOUSTON CHRON. (Dec. 4, 
2017), http://www.chron.com/business/energy/article/Wind-power-blows-past-coat-in-
Texas-12386751.php (revealing that in Texas, for example, wind supplies 15% of the power 
mix and in 2019 will likely overtake coal as the state’s second-largest source of energy).  
220 Justin Gillis and Hal Harvey, Why a Big Utility is Embracing Wind and Solar, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/06/opinion/utility-embracing-wind-
solar.html.  
221 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
222 See supra Part II. 
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Various parts of the federal government—Departments, 
agencies, commissions—are also under statutory duties (some more 
specific than others) to mitigate and adapt to certain climate change 
effects. For example,223 power-granting statutes (or orders) for the 
following federal entities commit all of them to consider and act upon 
various climate change effects: 
 
(1) The Department of Energy (DOE), particularly 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC); 
(2) The Department of Transportation (DOT); 
(3) The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); 
(4) The Department of Interior (DOI), particularly the 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 
and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM);  
(5) The United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), particularly the United States Forest 
Service; and 
(6) The United States Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), particularly the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  
 
Created in 1977 in the wake of an energy crisis,224 the DOE 
consolidated federal energy authority to make a “coordinated and 
effective administration of Federal energy policy and programs.”225 
The Department’s charge is to “deal with the short-, mid- and long-
term energy problems of the Nation.”226 And Congress instructed the 
Department to “place major emphasis on the development and 
commercial use of solar, geothermal, recycling and other 
technologies utilizing renewable energy resources.”227 In 1980, 
Congress amended the DOE’s enabling statute and instructed DOE 
                                                 
223 What follows is a non-exhaustive list; there may well be more such duties. 
224 Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq. (2012). 
225 42 U.S.C. § 7112 (2012). 
226 42 U.S.C. § 7112(3) (2012).  
227 See 42 U.S.C. § 7112(6) (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7372 (2012) (defining “renewable 
energy sources”). 
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“to establish incentives for the use of renewable energy resources, to 
improve and coordinate the dissemination of information to the public 
with respect to renewable energy resources, [and] to encourage the 
use of certain cost effective solar energy systems and conservation 
measures by the Federal Government.”228  
FERC is the successor to the FPC, which Congress 
established in 1920.229 Congress granted the FPC power over 
hydroelectric permitting and licensing, interstate electricity 
transmission and sales,230 and the natural gas industry, too.231 As the 
FPC’s successor, FERC’s jurisdiction is broad, extending to “the 
establishment, review, and enforcement of rates and charges for the 
transmission or sale of electric energy,”232 the “interconnection . . . of 
facilities for the generation, transmission, and sale of electric 
energy,”233 and the “establishment, review, and enforcement of rates 
and charges for the transmission and sale of natural gas.”234 Thus, 
FERC and the DOE are the main regulators of electricity and natural 
gas markets,235 and they are required to “establish incentives for the 
use of renewable energy resources.”236 
Created in 1966,237 the DOT has broad power to set emissions 
standards in the transportation sector,238 which accounts for about 27 
                                                 
228 42 U.S.C. § 7371 (2012). 
229 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. (2012). 
230 See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012) (“[T]he business of transmitting and selling electric energy 
[in interstate commerce] for ultimate distribution to the public.”). 
231 Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2012). 
232 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
233 Id. 
234 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(C) (2012). 
235 It is true that individual States have historically played—and continue to play—a 
significant role in regulating intrastate energy distribution. See, e.g., JOEL B. EISEN ET AL., 
ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 79 (4th ed. 2015) (“Today, every state has 
some sort of commission or agency charged with regulating different types of public utilities 
in the energy sector.”). Still, while the national energy market is a system of cooperative 
federalism, FERC and DOE are the most important and powerful institutions in it.  
236 42 U.S.C.A. § 7371 (West 2012). 
237 Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2012); see also Creation of 
Department of Transportation – Summary, DEP’T TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov 
/50/creation-department-transportation-summary (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (noting that the 
DOT includes the Federal Railroad, Highway, and Transit Administrations). 
238 See Juliana, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1246. 
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percent of the United States’ annual CO2 emissions.239 Congress 
instructed the DOT to “provid[e] fast, safe, efficient, and convenient 
transportation at the lowest cost consistent with those and other 
national objectives, including the efficient use and conservation of the 
resources of the United States.”240 In 1999, Congress created (within 
DOT) an Office of Climate Change and Environment explicitly 
responsible for planning, coordinating, and implementing “actions . . 
. to reduce transportation-related energy use and mitigate the effects 
of climate change,”241 and “to address the impacts of climate change 
on transportation systems and infrastructure.”242 In addition, the 
Office was required to “establish a clearinghouse of solutions . . . to 
reduce air pollution and transportation-related energy use and 
mitigate the effects of climate change.”243 
The EPA has broad power to set emissions standards in both 
the transportation and electricity-generating sectors. While the EPA 
has no single enabling statute, its founding documents and 
developments in the ensuing decades indicate perhaps the strongest 
regulatory duty both to mitigate GHG emissions and to adapt to their 
effects. In creating the EPA, President Nixon signaled his intent to 
organize the “Government’s environmentally-related activities . . . 
rationally and systematically.”244 Initially, the EPA was concerned 
mostly with pollution, and its original mandate was framed in terms 
of “protection of the environment.”245 At that time, air pollution was 
understood to refer to local pollutants, not GHGs.  
However, in its responsibility of administering various 
statutes—the CAA, the ESA, the CWA, and NEPA, for example246—
                                                 
239 Id. 
240 49 U.S.C. § 101(a) (2012). 
241 49 U.S.C. § 102(g)(1)(A) (2012). 
242 49 U.S.C. § 102(g)(1)(B) (2012). 
243 49 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2012). 
244 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 4321 (2012).  
245 See id.; William D. Ruckelshaus, EPA Order 1110.2 – Initial Organization of the EPA, 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Dec. 4, 1970), https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/epa-order-
11102-initial-organization-epa.html (creating, at the time of EPA’s establishment, five offices 
all of which regarded pollution: water quality, air pollution control, pesticides, radiation, and 
solid waste). 
246 See Laws and Executive Orders, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/laws-
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the EPA assumes numerous duties related to climate change 
effects.247 A particularly prominent example was the judicially 
imposed duty to regulate GHGs under the CAA should the EPA 
determine that GHGs are pollutants that “may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”248 In response, the 
EPA made the inevitable endangerment finding.249 The Tailpipe 
Rule—setting emissions and mileage standards for cars and light 
trucks—followed.250 Regulating GHGs as “pollutants” under the 
CAA meant that strict technology-based emissions standards now 
applied to new power plants. The EPA has applied these standards 
since 2011,251 and the Supreme Court upheld this practice in 2014.252  
The DOI,253 too, is under multiple duties to protect against 
certain effects of climate change that may be actionable, particularly 
with respect to wildfires. It is likely that current levels of wildfire 
result in part from increased levels of drought and extreme heat—both 
effects of climate change—combined with underuse of prescribed fire 
and mechanical thinning.254 The FWS and BLM in particular are 
                                                 
regulations/laws-and-executive-orders (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (noting that EPA 
administers these laws and more that potentially provide a vehicle for fighting GHG 
emissions and climate change effects). 
247 See PEEL, supra note 31, at 71 (discussing end-around tactics to fight climate change). 
248 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532–33 (2007) (holding that such an endangerment finding 
would bring the EPA under a mandatory duty established in CAA § 202(a)(1)). 
249 See Economics of Climate Change, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ 
environmental-economics/economics-climate-change (last visited Dec. 20, 2018) (describing 
its endangerment finding in Dec. 2009). 
250 Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010); John M. Broder, U.S. Issues Limits 
on Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Cars, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 2010/04/02/science/earth/02emit.html.  
251 New Source Review (NSR) Permitting, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/nsr/clean-air-act-permitting-greenhouse-gases (last visited Dec. 20, 
2018) (recounting the EPA’s issuing a Tailoring Rule to limit applicability of the permitting 
requirements to the largest stationary sources to avoid the requirements being prohibitively 
chilling on electricity generation); Robin Bravender, EPA Issues Final ‘Tailoring’ Rule for 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
gwire/2010/05/13/13greenwire-epa-issues-final-tailoring-rule-for-greenhouse-32021.html.  
252 See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., supra note 116. 
253 DOI houses the National Park Service, FWS, BLM, Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, and Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, among other federal 
entities. 
254 See, e.g., Matt Weiser, What Needs to be Done to Stop Wildfires in Drought-Killed 
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responsible for protecting public and adjacent lands from fire damage. 
In fact, Congress increased funding for such firefighting efforts in 
order to combat the huge uptick in wildfires.255 Congress also 
required the DOI to assess “impacts of climate change on the 
frequency and severity of wildfire” and the resulting “level of risk to 
communities.”256  
The FWS declares that 30 federal laws support its fire 
program,257 which is “responsible for protecting more land 
management units than any other federal agency” including many 
“small coastal and urban tracts with extensive wildland-urban 
interface areas.”258 The FWS has since the 1930s been using 
controlled burns to prevent “property loss and damage”259 and to 
“[m]inimize the risk to people, communities, and natural and cultural 
resources.”260  
The BLM’s firefighting duty arises both from its 
establishment261 and subsequent statutes.262 Since 1976, the BLM has 
                                                 
Forests, NEWSDEEPLY (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.newsdeeply.com/water/community 
/2017/10/11/what-needs-to-be-done-to-stop-wildfires-in-drought-killed-forests (citing a U.C. 
Berkeley scientist saying that statistics indicated “the number of additional acres that need to 
be treated [with prescribed fire is] at somewhere between 200,000 and 500,000 per year. So 
a very large amount . . . . [R]ight now the Forest Service is doing somewhere between 100,000 
and 200,000 per year”); see also Sherri Eng, Prescribed Burning and Mechanical Thinning 
Pose Little Risk to Forest Ecology, DEP’T AGRIC. (Jul. 26, 2012), 
https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2012/07/26/prescribed-burning-and-mechanical-thinning-
pose-little-risk-forest-ecology.  
255 43 U.S.C. § 1748a (2012) (beginning in 2009, appropriating to the DOI and USDA 
FLAME Wildfire Suppression Reserve Funds); 43 U.S.C. § 1748a(e)(1) (2012) (instructing 
that these funds “are separate from amounts for wildfire suppression activities annually 
appropriated to” the DOI and USDA; 43 U.S.C. § 1748b(a)–(b) (2012) (requiring that the 
DOI and USDA submit to Congress a report, to be reviewed every five years that, among 
other things, identifies cost-effective firefighting measures). 
256 43 U.S.C. § 1748b(b)(4), (6) (2012) (note that this requirement applies also to the USDA).  
257 See Departmental Manual – 620 DM 1 App. A, DEP’T INTERIOR (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://elips.doi.gov/ELIPS/DocView.aspx?id=4438&dbid=0. 
258 What We Do, FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/fire/what_we_do/ (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2018). 
259 Living With Fire, FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/fire/living_with_fire/ (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2018). 
260 Departmental Manual, supra note 257, at 1.7(A) (Risk Management and Risk Reduction). 
261 See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946, 5 U.S.C. app. 1 (2012). 
262 See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (2012); see also Fire and Aviation Program, BUREAU 
LAND MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/programs/public-safety-and-fire/fire-and-aviation (last 
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been able to draw upon a “working capital fund” that “shall be 
available . . . for expenses necessary for furnishing . . . supplies and 
equipment services in support of . . . fire control.”263 The BLM itself 
declares that it “is responsible for fire management on 245 million 
acres of public lands across the United States.”264 Housed within the 
USDA, the Forest Service, too, has since 1897 incurred a statutory 
duty to protect “against destruction by fire and depredations upon the 
public forests and national forests.”265 As such, the Forest Service 
proudly proclaims that it “has been managing wildland fire . . . for 
more than 100 years,”266 including by prescribed burns and 
mechanical thinning.267  
FEMA268 has since at least 1978 also incurred duties related 
to property damage and loss of life stemming from fires. 269 FEMA 
administers the United States Fire Administration,270 through which, 
for example, FEMA is to “review, evaluate, and suggest 
improvements in State and local fire prevention codes, building 
codes, and any relevant Federal or private codes and regulations.”271 
FEMA explains that the United States Fire Administration’s purpose 
is to “provide national leadership” in fire “prevention, preparedness 
and response.”272 
FEMA also administers NFIP, which was established in 
                                                 
visited Dec. 20, 2018). 
263 43 U.S.C. § 1736(a) (2012). 
264 What We Do, BUREAU LAND MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/programs/public-safety-and-
fire/fire-and-aviation/about-fire-and-aviation/what-we-do (last visited Dec. 20, 2018). 
265 16 U.S.C. § 551 (2012). 
266 Wildland Fire, FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/managing-land/fire (last visited Feb. 
27, 2018). 
267 See Weiser, supra note 254; cf. 16 U.S.C.A. § 551c-1 (West 2016) (detailing that Congress 
recently imposed procedural safety and coordination restrictions on prescribed burns, but 
preventing wildfire remains a primary duty of the Forest Service). 
268 Exec. Order No. 12,127, 44 Fed. Reg. 19,367 (Mar. 21, 1979).  
269 See Reorganization Act No. 3 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 41,943, (June 19, 1978) (entrusting, 
in § 201 (Fire Prevention), to FEMA the functions of the National Fire Prevention and Control 
Administration).  
270 See 15 U.S.C. § 2204 (2012). 
271 15 U.S.C. § 2211 (2012). 
272 About the U.S. Fire Administration, U.S. FIRE ADMIN. https://www.usfa.fema.gov 
/about/index.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2018).  
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1968.273 Congress intended NFIP to fill a gap in the private flood 
insurance industry in order to “promote the public interest by 
providing appropriate protection against the perils of flood losses and 
encouraging sound land use by minimizing exposure of property to 
flood losses.”274 NFIP was to expand “as knowledge is gained and 
experience is appraised, thus eventually making flood insurance 
coverage available on reasonable terms and conditions to persons 
who have need for such protection.”275 NFIP’s purpose was to “guide 
the development of proposed future construction . . . away from 
locations which are threatened by flood hazards” and to “authorize 
continuing studies of flood hazards in order to provide for a constant 
reappraisal of the flood insurance program.”276 
Today, NFIP is essentially the only flood insurer in the 
country; although it was established to stimulate private flood 
insurers, it ended up driving them out of the market.277 As a result, 
“[s]ince 1983, Washington has set the insurance rates, mapped the 
floodplains, [and] written the rules.”278 Climate change’s rapid 
progression has made this arrangement unmanageable. For example, 
NFIP has been in debt since Hurricane Katrina, and the program 
likely will never make it into the black again.279 Congress beat back 
                                                 
273 See The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 4001 et seq. (2012); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4011(a) (2012) (“[T]he Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency is 
authorized to establish and carry out a national flood insurance program which will enable 
interested persons to purchase insurance against loss resulting from physical damage to or 
loss of real property or personal property related thereto arising from any flood occurring in 
the United States.”). 
274 42 U.S.C. § 4001(c) (2012). 
275 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2012). 
276 42 U.S.C. § 4001(e) (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4101b(a) (2012) (“The Administrator . 
. . shall establish an ongoing program under which the Administrator shall review, update, 
and maintain National Flood Insurance Program rate maps in accordance with this section.”). 
277 See Mary Williams Walsh, A Broke, and Broken, Flood Insurance Program, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/04/business/a-broke-and-broken-flood-
insurance-program.html (“When Congress established the National Flood Insurance Program 
in 1968, it hoped to revive the private flood-insurance market . . . . But there were clashes, 
and eventually the government drove out the insurers and took over most operations.”); Ann 
Carrns, How To Assess Private Flood Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/08/your-money/how-to-assess-private-flood-
insurance.html (describing the slowly returning private flood insurance market). 
278 Walsh, supra note 277.  
279 See id.; see also PEEL, supra note 31, at 163 (“It is widely recognized that [NFIP] is not 
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FEMA’s recent attempt to raise NFIP premiums to reflect “true flood 
risk” because of the premiums’ unpopularity.280 A sunset provision 
retired NFIP in September 2017,281 and Congress currently has until 
May 31, 2019 to reauthorize it, even if in a reduced form.282 
Combined with FEMA’s responsibilities in administering 
NFIP—“guid[ing] the development of proposed future construction . 
. . away from locations which are threatened by flood hazards” and 
“provid[ing] for a constant reappraisal of the flood insurance 
program”283—is FEMA’s responsibility to identify flood-prone areas 
by making and publishing flood maps that inform NFIP’s rates.284 
That is, FEMA must “establish or update flood-risk zone data in all 
[flood plain and coastal] areas, and make estimates with respect to the 
rates of probable flood caused loss for the various flood zones for 
each of these areas.”285 FEMA determines flood elevations and areas 
with special flood hazards.286 In addition, FEMA must, “based on an 
analysis of all natural hazards affecting flood risks,” reassess these 
maps every five years.287  
FEMA itself acknowledges that its map-drawing and -
updating duties pose “a challenge” that has often led to outdated flood 
maps and unreflective insurance.288 For example, following 
                                                 
financially sustainable and that this will only be exacerbated by . . . more weather-related 
disasters.”). 
280 Id. at 149 (explaining that the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform and Modernization 
Act of 2012, see Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405 (2012), allowed FEMA to attempt to 
raise the premiums that would appropriately disincentivize people from building on coastal 
property, but the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, see Pub. L. No. 
113-89, 128 Stat. 1010 (2014), dealt FEMA a setback). 
281 42 U.S.C. § 4026 (2012). 
282 See National Flood Insurance Program: Reauthorization, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. 
AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program/national-flood-
insurance-program-reauthorization-guidance (last updated Dec. 23, 2018). 
283 42 U.S.C. § 4001(e) (2012). 
284 See, e.g., National Flood Insurance Program: Flood Hazard Mapping, FED. EMERGENCY 
MGMT. AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/national-flood-insurance-program-flood-hazard-
mapping (last updated Sept. 19, 2018). 
285 42 U.S.C. § 4101(a)(2) (2012). 
286 42 U.S.C. § 4104(a) (2012). 
287 42 U.S.C. § 4101(e) (2012). 
288 See Flood Map Revision Processes, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
https://www.fema.gov/flood-map-revision-processes (last updated Sept. 14, 2019); cf. Exec. 
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Hurricane Harvey in 2017, it came to light that “[a]bout 40 percent of 
the buildings estimated by [FEMA] to have been flooded in Harris 
County, Tex., are in areas considered to be ‘of minimal flood 
hazard.’”289 FEMA is only now updating New York City’s flood 
maps for the first time since 1983, even though Hurricane Sandy in 
2012 drew into focus those maps’ inadequacy.290 
 In sum, multiple federal entities bear constitutional and 
statutory duties—some general, others more specific—to address the 
effects of climate change, such as increased incidents of flooding and 
wildfire, in certain instances. None of these duties mandates that the 
federal government immediately do everything humanly possible to 
combat the chance that a flood or wildfire will invade private 
property. But, when the government knew or should have known that 
its inadequate action or inaction posed significant risk of serious harm 
to private property, breach of some of the above duties—such as 
failing to update flood maps properly or failing to manage overgrown 
forests—can serve as the basis for government’s liability, see infra 
Part VII. 
 
VI. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S INACTIVITY—ITS 
FAILURE TO ADAPT TO CERTAIN CLIMATE CHANGE EFFECTS—
CAN SUPPORT AN INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIM 
 
Both the government’s actions in promoting GHG emissions 
and its inaction in failing to adapt to certain climate change effects 
which it had a duty to address will support a successful inverse 
condemnation claim. This paper argues that inaction may support 
                                                 
Order No. 13,690, 80 Fed. Reg. 6425 (Jan. 30, 2015) (outlining Obama’s attempt to 
streamline these mapping duties); but see GRAHAM, supra note 87, at 351 (reporting Governor 
Andrew Cuomo’s quip to Obama in Oct. 2012: “We have a hundred-year flood every two 
years now”). 
289 Ford Fessenden et al., Water Damage From Hurricane Harvey Extended Far Beyond 
Flood Zones, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/01/us/houston-damaged-buildings-in-fema-
flood-zones.html; see also John Schwartz et al., Builders Said Their Homes Were Out of a 
Flood Zone. Then Harvey Came., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/02/us/houston-flood-zone-hurricane-harvey.html. 
290 See Chen, supra note 65.  
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such a claim when it is more likely than not that the government knew 
or should have known that its inactivity would lead to significant risk 
of serious harm to private property. Holding the government 
accountable based in part on its inaction is not a novel legal theory.291 
Even if still somewhat outside the mainstream, courts should 
recognize the theory because legal philosophy supports this result.  
 While not identical to the claim this paper advocates, 
plaintiffs’ claim in Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t provides the blueprint 
for such a successful inverse condemnation claim.292 In Saint Bernard 
Par. Gov’t, the court found the federal government liable for a 
temporary taking based on both governmental action and inaction. 
Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t was born out of the flooding that ensued in 
New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina in 2005,293 and also 
following Hurricanes Rita (2005), Gustav (2008), and Ike (2008). In 
the 1950s, with Congress’s blessing, the Army Corps of Engineers 
(ACE) had begun constructing the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet 
(MR-GO), “a seventy-six-mile-long navigational channel” intended 
to make navigation and trade easier.294  
After construction was complete in 1968, “the banks eroded 
                                                 
291 Note that some other major areas of law sanction holding governmental agencies 
accountable for inactions. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012) 
(noting that a reviewing court will “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed”); see also Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s 
Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 372 (2014). 
292 Note that Saint. Bernard Par. Gov’t is not the only case in which governmental inaction 
in the face of an affirmative duty to act has provided part of the basis for a successful inverse 
condemnation claim; see also Litz v. Maryland, 131 A.3d 923 (Md. 2016) (noting also that 
the Minnesota Constitution Art. I § 13 (as interpreted in Evenson v. City of Saint Paul Bd. of 
Appeals, 467 N.W.2d 363, 365 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)) explains that an “unconstitutional 
taking is a governmental action or inaction that deprives a landowner of all reasonable uses 
of its land”); Jordan v. Saint Johns County, 63 So.3d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Swartz 
v. Beach, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (D. Wyo. 2002); Alger v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 917 A.2d 
508 (Vt. 2006); Arreola v. Cty. of Monterey, 99 Cal. App. 4th 722 (2002), as modified on 
denial of reh’g (July 23, 2002)); cf. Timothy M. Mulvaney & Joseph William Singer, Move 
Along To Where? Property In Service of Democracy (A Tribute To André Van Der Walt), 19 
HARVARD PUB. L. WORKING PAPER NO. 17-40 (2017). 
293 Saint. Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 712 (disclosing that as a result of Hurricane 
Katrina, somewhere “between 68% and 98% of homes [in Saint Bernard Parish and the Lower 
Ninth Ward] were severely damaged or destroyed”).  
294 See id. at 691, 698. 
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at an estimated twenty-seven to thirty-eight feet per year.”295 Even 
during construction, the ACE was aware that during a big enough 
storm, the MR-GO might exacerbate a storm surge into New Orleans 
due to a “funneling effect.”296 The ACE became even more aware of 
this possible effect as it learned more about the MR-GO’s effects on 
salinity, habitat and wetland loss, and erosion.297 The court 
concluded: 
[I]t was foreseeable to the Army Corps that the 
construction, expansion, operation, and failure 
to maintain the MR-GO would increase 
salinity, increase habitat/land loss, increase 
erosion, and increase storm surge that could be 
exacerbated by a ‘funnel effect’ and likely 
cause flooding of Plaintiffs’ properties in a 
hurricane or severe storm.298 
  
During Hurricane Katrina, the MR-GO had just such an effect. The 
government was liable in part because it took no action to correct the 
problem even when it knew that the failure to maintain the MR-GO 
posed a significant risk of serious harm to property in New Orleans.299  
In Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t, the court found that the ACE constructed 
the MR-GO, knew about some of the risks it posed at the time, and 
subsequently learned about more. The court further found that by 
constructing the channel in the first place, the ACE assumed the duty 
of repairing it properly, which they failed to do. So, when Katrina 
struck and flooded parts of New Orleans in ways that were 
foreseeable to the ACE, the court found the ACE liable for the 
temporary taking of those flooded properties by dint of their 
constructing the MR-GO and their inaction in not fortifying or 
repairing it despite knowledge of its dangers. Saint Bernard Par. 
Gov’t establishes that takings liability may arise when “inaction by 
                                                 
295 Id. at 721. 
296 Id. at 700. 
297 Id. at 704–06, 720–22 (detailing a Coast 2050 report presented to the ACE in 1998 and an 
EPA Task Force report in 2000). 
298 Id. at 723. 
299 Id. at 704. 
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the government exacerbates flooding from severe weather through its 
failure to properly design or maintain federally owned property.”300 
There are important differences between Saint Bernard Par. 
Gov’t and the claim this paper advocates. Two such differences 
regard the creation of the dangerous condition and, relatedly, the 
origin of the government’s duty. First, in Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t, 
the ACE itself built the MR-GO, whereas in the climate change 
context, the United States did not alone create climate change. But, as 
this paper argues, the federal government’s liability in this context is 
based both on its role in promoting climate change and its failure to 
adapt adequately to the particular climate change effect at issue. 
Second, while in Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t the ACE assumed a duty 
to repair the MR-GO by building it in the first place, various entities 
within the federal government assume statutory duties to act in certain 
instances, see supra Part V. Thus, even though there are important 
differences, St. Bernard Par. Gov’t’s rule—that a governmental 
entity may be liable for a taking when it is under a duty to act and 
knows or should know that its inaction will cause significant risk of 
serious harm to private property—applies to the claims advocated 
here. 
In addition, legal theory supports holding the federal 
government liable based in part on its failure to adapt to certain 
climate change effects. First, because the federal government is 
inextricably intertwined with regulating the electricity and 
transportation sectors in the United States, its “active role means it 
has active responsibilities” and “cannot divest itself of responsibility 
for the allocation of burdens and benefits in society.”301 The federal 
government may not throw its hands up now, blameless, because the 
federal government has already, through law and regulation, created 
the rules of the game and set it in motion for over a century.302 
                                                 
300 JENNIFER KLEIN, POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENTS FOR FAILURE TO PREPARE FOR 
CLIMATE CHANGE 25 (2015).  
301 Christopher Serkin, Affirmative Constitutional Commitments: The State’s Obligations to 
Property Owners, 2 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 109, 131 (2013). 
302
 Cf. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, NO FREEDOM WITHOUT REGULATION (2015) (making a 
similar argument with respect to the federal government’s role in failing to regulate the 
housing market in the build-up to the subprime crisis).  
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Second, the government should sometimes be held accountable for a 
“passive taking”303—its “failure to act in the face of a changing 
world”304—because sometimes the Constitution compels the 
government to act to protect private property. To ensure that the 
government does not become an insurer of last resort, a passive taking 
should arise only when “the government is so entangled in the 
substantive content of property that the line between acts and 
omissions becomes especially blurry.”305 This entanglement exists in 
the claims that this paper advocates: the federal government’s 
regulating coastal property through NFIP, for example, involves 
setting insurance rates that could be seen as both actions and inactions 
(in not choosing another rate).  
Both as a matter of economic incentives and longstanding 
property theory, recognizing passive takings in certain situations is 
desirable. Forcing actors to internalize the costs of their actions is a 
bedrock principle of economics. But without passive takings, the 
government does not internalize the cost of its decisions when 
inaction is the “most costly choice of all.”306 As a matter of property 
theory more generally, it is well-established that the substantive 
content of property rights can change as community needs do.307 As 
a result, the government “cannot simply set the rules and then sit on 
the sidelines while private parties fight it out.”308  
A government should not be liable every time it does not act. 
But when the effects of climate change have, more likely than not, 
caused a plaintiff’s harm, governmental inaction may form part of the 
basis for liability if the government was under a duty to address the 
                                                 
303 See Serkin, supra note 291, at 346. 
304 Id. at 345; see also Serkin, supra note 301, at 118–26 (discussing in more detail property 
theorists who recognize the legitimacy of passive takings, particularly Hanoch Dagan’s 
theory of average reciprocity and Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver’s theory of 
human flourishing). 
305 Serkin, supra note 291, at 347. 
306 Id. at 347, 361–364.  
307 See id. at 370 (“[T]he same regulation that might have been a taking at one time might not 
be later as conditions in the world change.”); see id. at 370, n.110 (citing Vill. of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), to support the proposition because in Euclid the 
Court found that a zoning regulation that might have constituted a taking in an agrarian society 
became okay in the context of property rights in an urbanized environment). 
308 Serkin, supra note 291, at 371. 
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climate change effect at issue and knew or should have known that its 
inaction in the face of that duty would lead to significant risk of 
serious harm to private property.  
 
V. FIVE-FACTOR TAKINGS TEST: A MODIFICATION OF SAINT 
BERNARD PAR. GOV’T/ARK. GAME 
 
In analyzing inverse condemnation claims where the federal 
government’s liability is based on its role in bringing about climate 
change and failing to respond to its effects, courts should use a 
modified version of the five-factor takings test put forth in Saint 
Bernard Par. Gov’t and Ark. Game. Those five factors are: (1) 
whether the plaintiff asserts a protectable property interest under state 
law; (2) the character of the property and the owner’s reasonable, 
investment-backed expectations; (3) whether plaintiff’s harm was 
foreseeable to the federal government; (4) whether the United States 
caused plaintiff’s harm; (5) whether plaintiff’s harm is substantial 
enough to rise to the level of a taking.309 The issue requiring the most 
attention is causation.  
 
A.  Protectable property interest under state law 
This prong would not be difficult to satisfy in any of the three 
successful scenarios supra. All states recognize property interests in 
land;310 in each scenario, plaintiff owns such interest.  
 
B. Character of property interest and owner’s reasonable, 
investment-backed expectations 
At issue here is whether the plaintiff’s investment-backed 
expectations are reasonable, which is often determined by state 
law.311 In a takings case concerning flooding (and, by extension, a 
wildfire that completely razes a parcel), courts should consider the 
reasonableness of plaintiff’s reliance on governmental assurances—
                                                 
309 See, e.g., Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 719. 
310 See, e.g., id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19:1 (1975), which defines property as 
“immovable property”). 
311 See Ark. Game, 568 U.S. at 38. 
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through flood maps and flood insurance, for example—that give the 
impression that it is safe to build in a certain area. Courts should also 
consider plaintiff’s “knowledge of any prior flooding.”312 However, 
knowledge of prior flooding (or wildfires) does not equate necessarily 
to unreasonable expectations. For example, in Saint Bernard Par. 
Gov’t, the court held that despite plaintiffs’ knowledge that their 
properties “were in a floodplain and ‘had experienced flooding in the 
past,’ that flooding was not ‘comparable’ to the flooding during 
Hurricane Katrina . . . giving rise to the temporary takings claim at 
issue.”313 Similarly, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Court refused 
to find an owner’s investment-backed expectations unreasonable as a 
rule, even when they ran counter to restrictive regulations on the 
property that had been in place at the time of acquisition.314 
The three successful scenarios supra would satisfy this 
examination. Plaintiffs in the flooding scenarios will have relied on 
FEMA flood maps before buying and developing their coastal 
property, and residents in neighborhoods abutting national forests 
will have relied on multiple federal entities’ duties to treat those 
forests to prevent fire from spreading. Even if plaintiffs’ harm 
resulted from flooding from a recurring storm, such as in the second 
successful scenario, it would still be reasonable for plaintiffs to rely 
on FEMA’s flood maps and offered insurance. In addition, if 
plaintiffs’ harm results from a flood or wildfire not “comparable” to 
prior floods or wildfires, plaintiffs’ investment-backed expectations 
might still have been reasonable, as the court found in Saint Bernard 
Par. Gov’t. 
 
C.  Foreseeability 
 “Also relevant to the takings inquiry is the degree to which 
the invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of authorized 
government action.”315 This inquiry will be a factual one about what 
                                                 
312 Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 719. 
313 Id. at 720 (quoting Ark. Game, 568 U.S. at 39). 
314 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (“Were the Court to accept that rule, the postenactment transfer 
of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no 
matter how extreme or unreasonable.”); see also SINGER, supra note 39, at 723. 
315 Ark. Game, 568 U.S. at 39. 
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the government knew and when, and it overlaps with the examination 
of proximate cause, see infra Section VII.D.ii. Due to scientific 
studies that the United States either commissioned or knew of, 
important reports and developments in the international community, 
and its own actions,316 the federal government cannot earnestly claim 
that the floods and fires contemplated by the three scenarios supra 
were unforeseeable. A plaintiff could argue that the federal 
government was aware, or should have been aware, of the potential 
harms of climate change-induced flooding and wildfire by the late 
1970s. But by 1990, at the very latest, the government was actually 
aware of anthropogenic climate change and its effects, such as 
flooding and wildfire: the EPA argued in Massachusetts that it should 
not be forced to regulate GHGs under the CAA because “Congress 
was well aware of the global climate change issue when it last 
comprehensively amended the [CAA] in 1990, yet it declined to adopt 
a proposed amendment establishing binding emissions 
limitations.”317 While plaintiffs will concentrate on different facets of 
the government’s awareness, what follows is a broad summary 
intended to benefit a wide variety of plaintiffs who might seek to 
bring inverse condemnation claims.  
 The United States has long addressed the pressure to act on 
climate change by simply funding more research.318 One might view 
this either cynically or charitably,319 but there is no serious debate as 
to what the research has showed: anthropogenic climate change 
exists.320 After scientists began tracking atmospheric CO2 in the late 
                                                 
316 E.g., major environmental legislation in the 1970s, international treaties between 1992 and 
2016, and Executive Orders and regulations and their subsequent revocation. To limit 
redundancy, this section simply directs the reader to supra Part IV and infra Section VII.C. 
317 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 511–12 (2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
318 See, e.g., BAILEY, supra note 7, at 24. 
319 Cynically, one may think of the anecdote of President Bush’s OIRA farce. See REVESZ, 
supra note 112. Charitably, one may think that continuing sponsored research might “help 
institutionalize [sic] attention to the problem within government.” See BAILEY, supra note 7, 
at 24. 
320 See, e.g., PHILPOTT, supra note 210, at 8–20 (using only documents obtainable from the 
EPA or the U.S. Global Change Research Program and listing as measurable climate effects: 
precipitation increase, heavy downpour increase, more frequent extreme weather events, 
increase in hurricane activity, more uncertain storms, sea level rise, melting ice, and ocean 
acidification). 
136 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 26 
 
1950s, by 1965 that data was sufficient for President Johnson’s 
Science Advisory Committee to report that CO2 levels were rising and 
warming the earth. While scientists and politicians had little idea what 
would come next,321 the Science Advisory Committee noted that by 
2020, increases in CO2 “may be sufficient to produce measurable and 
perhaps marked changes in climate . . . deleterious . . . [to] human 
beings.”322 
 In the 1970s, Congress passed major environmental laws, but 
they focused on local pollution rather than GHGs. Congressional 
hearings on global warming continued.323 A 1977 report by the 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS)324 called for action, though, in 
the face of uncertainty, before it was too late.325 Perhaps in response, 
Congress created a National Climate Program Office to “coordinate 
climate-related research among a wide variety of . . . government 
entities, including EPA, NASA . . . and the Departments of 
Agriculture, Energy, and State.”326 
 Climate change research, rather than action, defined the 
1980s, too, but the research became increasingly concerning. In 1984, 
for example, a DOE-sponsored report explained that burning fossil 
fuels was responsible for the rise of atmospheric CO2 from 1860 to 
1982.327 And in 1988, NASA scientist James Hansen testified before 
a Senate Committee “that he was 99 percent certain ‘the greenhouse 
effect has been detected and it is changing our climate now.’”328  
 The 1990s marked the beginning of the international climate 
change movement and also the United States’ intransigence in the 
face of that movement. In the United States, research continued. In 
                                                 
321 REVESZ, supra note 77, at 115–16 (noting that the House Subcommittee on Science, 
Research, and Development was still in the early stages of fact gathering). 
322 BAILEY, supra note 7, at 49. 
323 REVESZ, supra note 77, at 118. 
324 See 36 U.S.C. § 150303 (2012) (created by Congress in 1863 in order to “investigate, 
examine, experiment, and report upon any subject of science or art”). 
325 REVESZ, supra note 77, at 118. 
326 Id. at 118–19 (describing creation of National Climate Program Act of 1978, supra note 
83). 
327 See CARBON DIOXIDE INFO. CTR., CDIC NUMERIC DATA COLLECTION (1984). 
328 REVESZ, supra note 77, at 119; see also BREWER, supra note 4, at 150 (recalling that the 
Committee was the Senate Energy and National Resources Committee). 
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1990, Congress established the United States Global Change 
Research Program (USGCRP), a group of thirteen federal agencies 
and Departments, to “assist the Nation and the world to understand, 
assess, predict, and respond to human-induced and natural processes 
of global change.”329 Still—despite increasing international 
consensus and Vice President Gore—all the government could 
muster were “an assortment of small programs, most of them 
voluntary and focused on energy conservation” that left 
environmental groups “underwhelmed.”330  
 In the 2000s, climate change consensus became mainstream, 
but the federal government remained unwilling to address it. Many 
believed that climate change had played a role in Hurricane Katrina 
in 2005, thus bringing the issue further into the public’s eye.331 The 
NAS had also cautioned in 2005 that “the scientific understanding of 
climate change is now sufficiently clear to justify nations taking 
prompt actions.”332 In 2006, over two dozen massive companies—
“including utilities and oil companies”333—and national 
environmental groups joined in the United States Climate Action 
Partnership (USCAP)334 and pledged “to work with the President, the 
Congress, and all other stakeholders to enact an environmentally 
effective, economically sustainable, and fair climate change program 
consistent with our principles at the earliest practicable date.”335 
Recall also that in Massachusetts in 2007, the Court acknowledged 
the reality of anthropogenic climate change,336 and the EPA 
strenuously argued before the Court that the government had been 
                                                 
329 About USGCRP, GLOBALCHANGE.GOV, https://www.globalchange.gov/about (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2018) (quoting from the Global Change Research Act of 1990). 
330 REVESZ, supra note 77, at 120. 
331 See, e.g., New Hurricane Study Whips Up Warming Debate, NBC NEWS (Sept. 15, 2005), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9356205/ns/us_news-environment/t/new-hurricane-study-
whips-warming-debate/#.WnnTrZM-c1g. 
332 U.S. CLIMATE ACTION P’SHIP, A CALL FOR ACTION 2 (2007) (quoting the NAS report) 
(hereinafter “USCAP REPORT”). 
333 REVESZ, supra note 77, at 127. 
334 See United States Climate Action Partnership, MERIDIAN INST., 
http://www.merid.org/en/Content/Projects/United_States_Climate_Action_Partnership.aspx 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2018). 
335 USCAP REPORT, supra note 332, at 11. 
336 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521–23.  
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well aware of climate change and its dangers by, at the latest, 1990.337 
Since 2007, the United States government’s understanding of 
anthropogenic climate change’s causes and likely effects has only 
grown stronger. In 2009, USCAP released a “Blueprint for 
Legislative Action,” which detailed these organizations’ preferences 
for a carbon cap-and-trade bill.338 Also in 2009, the USGCRP 
published a report that proclaimed: “[W]arming of the climate is 
unequivocal” and “due primarily to human-induced emissions of 
heat-trapping gases.”339 The report also explained that climate change 
effects—including increased risk of flooding in coastal areas due to 
sea-level rise and storm surge—were already observable in the United 
States.340 NGOs continued calling on the government to take 
action.341 Meanwhile, the Obama Administration was issuing a 
groundbreaking rule regarding the auto industry that amounted to “the 
first binding federal regulation of GHGs in U.S. history.”342 In 2012, 
Hurricane Sandy again brought climate change into the national 
political spotlight.343  
 Even more recent governmental reports drive home the point 
more forcefully. In 2014, the USGCRP released a third national 
climate assessment that stressed that “climate change, once 
considered an issue for a distant future, has moved firmly into the 
present.”344 In 2017, the USGCRP’s fourth national climate 
                                                 
337 Id. at 511–12. 
338 See Jennifer Layke, The USCAP Blueprint for Legislative Action, WORLD RES. INST. (Jan. 
15, 2009), http://www.wri.org/blog/2009/01/uscap-blueprint-legislative-action; REVESZ, 
supra note 77, at 127. 
339 USGCRP REPORT, supra note 57, at 9. 
340 See id. at 12.  
341 See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION, supra note 118, at 2 (“In this report, the authors 
called for a National Adaptation Program and recommended new institutional mechanisms 
and roles for federal agencies to mainstream the consideration of climate change across 
agency operations, programs, and services.”). 
342 Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons from the “Car 
Deal,” 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 366 (2011). 
343 See PEEL, supra note 31, at 145 (“[Sandy’s] severity and uncanny timing – just before the 
2012 presidential election, in which climate change had not featured as an issue up to that 
point – catapulted climate change and adaptation issues to front-page news.”). 
344 Id. at 110.  
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assessment spoke even more urgently.345 The report explained that 
the “incidence of daily tidal flooding is accelerating in more than 25 
Atlantic and Gulf Coast cities,”346 and that the “incidence of large 
forest fires in the western United States and Alaska has increased 
since the early 1980s and is projected to further increase.”347 The 
previous year, the EPA had released an equally forceful report.348 
These reports are only the highlights: many more studies prove the 
United States’ awareness of anthropogenic climate change. 
 International developments—both those in which the United 
States has played a part and those in which it has not—also put the lie 
to any argument that plaintiff’s harm in the three successful scenarios 
supra was not foreseeable. While the United States has not committed 
itself to a binding carbon emissions treaty,349 it has joined numerous 
international agreements and treaties as a signatory and participated 
in global conferences on climate change. 
 The international community began to take climate change 
seriously in the late 1970s. In 1979, the World Meteorological 
Organization and the United Nations Environmental Program 
together inaugurated the World Climate Program, which established 
a yearly meeting to discuss climate research and to publicize 
findings.350 The United States was well aware of these meetings. In 
fact, in 1987, the United States suggested that these groups “create a 
                                                 
345 See U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT: 
FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT (2017) (hereinafter “NCA4”); see also Lisa 
Friedman & Glenn Thrush, U.S. Report Says Humans Cause Climate Change, Contradicting 
Top Trump Officials, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/climate/us-climate-
report.html?action=click&contentCollection=Climate&module=RelatedCoverage&region=
EndOfArticle&pgtype=article/ (reporting on the NCA4 report). 
346 NCA4, supra note 345, at 10; see also id. at 27 (“As sea levels have risen, the number of 
tidal floods each year that cause minor impacts (also called ‘nuisance floods’) have increased 
5 to 10-fold since the 1960s in several U.S. coastal cities (very high confidence) . . . . Tidal 
flooding will continue increasing in depth, frequency, and extent this century (very high 
confidence) . . . . [S]ea level rise will increase the frequency and extent of extreme flooding 
associated with coastal storms.”). 
347 Id. at 11. 
348
 See CLIMATE CHANGE INDICATORS, supra note 4. 
349 BAILEY, supra note 7, at 26. 
350 Id. at 53. 
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new panel to study the scientific issue surrounding climate 
change.”351 As a result, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) was formed and issued its First Assessment Report in 
1990.352  
The United Nations General Assembly put its imprimatur on 
climate change efforts by helping to organize a foundational climate 
change meeting in Rio in the summer of 1992.353 There, 154 countries 
(including the United States) signed the UNFCCC,354 which 
contained only a voluntary pledge that countries stabilize their GHG 
emissions at 1990 levels by 2000 (and so the United States had no 
problem ratifying it before it came into “force” in 1994),355 and 
allowed for annual meetings of the signatories. Released in 1995, the 
IPCC’s Second Assessment Report356 proclaimed that anthropogenic 
climate change was supported by the “balance of evidence”357 and 
also forecasted—if the status quo remained—that by 2100 
temperatures would rise 3.6ºF and global sea level would rise 50 
centimeters.358  
Perhaps spurred on by the IPCC’s Second Assessment 
Report, the parties to the UNFCCC came together in Kyoto in 1997 
to discuss reducing GHG emissions. The resulting Kyoto Protocol 
provided country-specific GHG emissions targets. The United States 
signed (with a hollow commitment to reduce GHG emissions seven 
percent below 1990 levels by 2012), but it never agreed to be bound 
by the Protocol.359 In fact, the Senate had made clear that it would not 
agree to any treaty that treated developed and developing countries 
unequally.360 By 2000, GHG emissions in the United States “were 14 
                                                 
351 Id.  
352 See id.; REVESZ, supra note 77, at 119; INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT (1990). 
353 BAILEY, supra note 7, at 61. 
354 REVESZ, supra note 77, at 120; BREWER, supra note 4, at 150. 
355 REVESZ, supra note 77, at 120. 
356 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: THE SCIENCE 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE (1996). 
357 Id. at 4; see also REVESZ, supra note 77, at 120. 
358 See REVESZ, supra note 77, at 121. 
359 Id.  
360 See supra note 102 (explaining the Byrd-Hagel Resolution). 
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percent above 1990 levels.”361 
Following the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report in 2001362 
and its Fourth Assessment Report in 2007,363 international scientific 
consensus was crystalizing and nearly uniform.364 Of course, the 
United States was well aware of this consensus: The Obama 
Administration was attempting to regulate based on it. And, in 2009, 
at the G8 Summit in Italy and at the United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen, President Obama urged the world to 
follow America’s lead in reducing GHG emissions.365 The IPCC’s 
Fifth Assessment Report in 2014366 simply drove the point home: 
“Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions . . . are extremely likely to 
have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-
20th century.”367 The Paris Climate Agreement of 2015 followed.368 
Under the Agreement, signatories pledged to hold global warming to 
under 3.6ºF, and the United States in particular “pledged to cut its 
greenhouse gas emissions 26 to 28 percent below 2005 levels by 
2025.”369 President Trump, however, notified the United Nations that 
the United States intends to withdraw from the Agreement at the 
earliest possible date (late 2020), making the United States the only 
                                                 
361 REVESZ, supra note 77, at 122. 
362 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE 
SCIENTIFIC BASIS (2001). 
363 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE 
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (2007). 
364 See REVESZ, supra note 77, at 124 (noting the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report declared 
that “with greater than 90 percent confidence . . . the majority of warming since the mid-
twentieth century was due to increases in greenhouse gas emissions associated with human 
activities”). 
365 See President Obama Delivers Remarks at G8 Summit, THE WASH. POST (July 9, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/09/AR2009070902021.html (the G8 speech); Obama’s Speech 
on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/us/politics/23obama.text.html (the Copenhagen 
speech). 
366 See IPCC 5TH SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 5. 
367 Id. at 4. 
368 See supra note 129. 
369 Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-
agreement.html?_r=0. 
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country opposed to it.370 
In sum, every case will present a different problem that courts 
must investigate factually. But—at least with respect to harms caused 
by flood due to sea level rise and storm surge or wildfires in especially 
dry and hot areas—it will be difficult for the United States to claim 
that certain (and common) harms were not foreseeable consequences 
of the United States’ actions to promote GHG emissions and its 
failure to adapt to those climate change effects.  
 
D. Causation 
Normally, causation is not difficult for a plaintiff to show in a 
physical takings case. For example, in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., it 
was clear that Wisconsin had authorized construction of a dam and 
that “by reason of the dam, the water of the lake was so raised as to 
cause it to overflow all [plaintiff’s] land.”371 Similarly, in Ark. Game, 
the ACE clearly caused the flooding at issue because it authorized the 
dam releases that led to the flooding.372 And in Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the cause of physical 
invasion—a nonconsensual cable installation on a landlord’s 
property—was also plain: New York City had passed a law 
authorizing such installation.373 
Because the question hardly comes up, the upshot is that there 
is not “judicial consensus” regarding the causation connection in 
takings cases.374 However, precedent suggests that the test seems to 
mirror the test for causation in tort law: elements of both cause-in-fact 
and proximate (or moral) cause both seem necessary.375 In the claims 
                                                 
370 See Lisa Friedman, Syria Joins Paris Climate Accord, Leaving Only U.S. Opposed, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/07/climate/syria-joins-paris-
agreement.html?_r=1. 
371 80 U.S. at 177; but cf. Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 103 (2005) (explaining 
that Pumpelly “contains one of the Supreme Court’s first important discussions of causation 
in the takings context” in that it laid down the marker for using cause-in-fact as a test). 
372 568 U.S. at 27–28. 
373 458 U.S. 419, 421–23 (1982). 
374 See Laitos, supra note 37, at 1183–85; Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 112–120 (presenting and 
attempting to resolve some of the confusion). 
375 See, e.g., Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 101–02 (noting that “takings jurisprudence continues to 
rely on general tort concepts such as causation to evaluate liability” and that “[f]ederal courts 
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advocated by this paper, the federal government was both a cause-in-
fact and a proximate, moral cause of plaintiff’s harm. 
 
1. Cause-in-fact 
Without saying so explicitly, Supreme Court precedent makes 
clear that factual causation is required to hold the government liable 
for a taking. In most cases, this analysis is almost entirely elided 
because it is not in dispute.376 In the factual situations contemplated 
here, though, cause-in-fact is more complicated because climate 
change effects, such as flooding by sea level rise and storm surge and 
wildfire caused by drought and heat wave, are so complex. For a 
plaintiff here to establish factual causation, she must show, first, by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the underlying cause of plaintiff’s 
harm was a climate change effect and, second, that the United States 
government’s role in promoting climate change—in addition to a 
particular government entity’s failure to adapt adequately to the 
particular climate change effect at issue—indicates that the federal 
government was a “substantial factor” of plaintiff’s harm. 
 
a. Whether a preponderance of the evidence shows that the 
underlying cause of plaintiff’s harm was a climate change 
effect 
The inverse condemnation claims contemplated here are 
necessarily premised on the idea that climate change is likely 
responsible for plaintiff’s underlying harm—either a flood or a fire, 
in the five scenarios supra. If the underlying cause of plaintiff’s harm 
were not a climate change effect,377 plaintiff might have recourse 
against the government, but not through a takings claim. 
Determining whether the underlying cause of plaintiff’s harm 
is more likely than not a climate change effect could be either easy or 
                                                 
have embraced this relationship between tort concepts of property and takings claims”). 
376 See, e.g., Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 166; Cress, 243 U.S. at 318 (stating as a fact of the case 
that the backwater flood at issue “result[ed] from the construction and maintenance by the 
government of certain locks and dams”); Causby, 328 U.S. at 256 (eliding a consideration of 
causation because the only planes at issue were owned by the United States government). 
377 See, e.g., Laitos, supra note 37, at 1206–07 (citing Leeth v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 467 
(1991), as an example of a case in which the Act of Nature exception was applied). 
144 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 26 
 
difficult. In the first successful scenario supra, based on flooding 
from sea level rise, the inquiry would be easy. Recall that sea level 
rise is the clearest and most easily observable climate change 
effect.378 Thus, scientific consensus, common sense, and reasonable 
inferences all align and indicate that it is more likely than not—
virtually certain, in fact—that the underlying cause of plaintiff’s harm 
is a climate change effect.  
The storm surge and wildfire contemplated in the second and 
third successful scenarios supra are slightly more difficult cases. But 
the connection between plaintiff’s harm and climate change still 
seems rather strong because in both cases scientists and climatologists 
made governmental entities aware of the high likelihood of such a 
storm surge or wildfire occurring. In the second scenario, particularly, 
recent, recurring storm surges also indicated that sea level rise—
clearly a climate change effect—was at least partly to blame for those 
harms.  
In general, though, it is true that even when overall trends 
suggest a connection between GHG levels and a climate change 
effect,379 attributing particular, extreme weather events to 
anthropogenic causes can be difficult.380 But, there are burgeoning 
scientific and statistical methods that attempt to correlate such events 
with their anthropogenic causes. In fact, attribution science is 
growing, and it is perhaps the next frontier in climate change 
research.381 One prominent form of event attribution is Probabilistic 
                                                 
378 See supra note 9 and accompanying text; NCA4, supra note 345, at 333 (“Global mean 
sea level (GMSL) has risen by about 7–8 inches . . . since 1900 . . . (very high confidence) . . 
. contributing to a rate of rise that is greater than during any preceding century in at least 2,800 
years (medium confidence).”) 
379 See, e.g., NCA4 Highlights: Extreme Weather, GLOBALCHANGE.GOV RES., 
https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/highlights/report-findings/extreme-weather, (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2018) (“Some extreme weather and climate events have increased in recent decades, 
and new and stronger evidence confirms that some of these increases are related to human 
activities.”). 
380 See PEEL, supra note 31, at 145 (“Impacts from a single extreme weather event, such as 
Superstorm Sandy, are the most complex to connect to climate change as a scientific matter. 
Nonetheless, such events fit with the trend toward more extreme weather in North America 
that can be linked to climate change.”).  
381 NAT’L ACADS. SCIS. ENG’G & MED., ATTRIBUTION OF EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2016) (hereinafter, “NAS ATTRIBUTION”) (noting that “the 
past decade has seen a remarkable increase in interest and activity in the extreme event 
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Event Attribution (PEA).382 PEA works by “simulating the [extreme 
weather] event in today’s world, and then . . . remov[ing] 
anthropogenic emissions from the climate model’s atmosphere, and 
do[ing] the same experiment again.”383 Only recently—within the last 
five years—has PEA become plausible because of the advance of 
computing power.384 Because predicting and projecting extreme 
weather events in the future might save hundreds of thousands of 
lives, improving attribution techniques will likely receive even more 
attention from scientists and mathematicians in the coming years.385  
Courts should take PEA and other legitimate event attribution 
sciences into account in deciding whether anthropogenic climate 
change was the underlying cause of a particular plaintiff’s harm. This 
determination will require courts to engage with facts, science, and 
statistics, which might be thought to be outside their institutional 
competency. But difficulty of cases is hardly a reason to deny 
meritorious plaintiffs relief if they are otherwise entitled to it.  
A word on the preponderance standard employed here. 
Because courts do not evaluate causation in the takings context in the 
systematic way that this paper proposes, there is hardly any explicit 
                                                 
attribution field,” and that interest is increasing even more in the past few years: “From 2012 
to 2015, the number of research groups submitting studies to this issue has grown by more 
than a factor of five.”); see id. at 1–3 (remarking that advances in this field may be due both 
to the improved understanding of “the climate and weather mechanisms that produce extreme 
events” and to “rapid progress . . . in the methods that are used for event attribution,” which 
rely primarily on “the observational record to determine the change in probability or 
magnitude of events” or on “model simulations to compare the manifestation of an event in a 
world with human-caused climate change to that in a world without”); see id. at x (pointing 
out that scientists already believe all of the triggering events in the three scenarios supra—
“[d]roughts, floods, and wildfires”—have “a large weather and climate signal”). For more on 
extreme heat and drought, see id. at 90–99. For more on wildfires, see id. at 115. For more on 
tropical cyclones (which can lead to storm surges), see id. at 107. 
382 For a detailed summary of other types of event attribution in use today, see id. at 47–83. 
383 Annie Sneed, Yes, Some Extreme Weather Can Be Blamed on Climate Change, SCI. AM. 
(Jan. 2, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/yes-some-extreme-weather-can-
be-blamed-on-climate-change/; see also FRIEDERIKE OTTO ET AL., THE SCIENCE OF 
ATTRIBUTING EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS AND ITS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO ASSESSING 
LOSS AND DAMAGE ASSOCIATED WITH CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS (explaining PEA). 
384 See Sneed, supra note 383 (“The science really only came into existence within the last 
five years . . . . Only in the 2000s did [PEA] become an option because of greater computing 
power.”). 
385 See, e.g., NAS ATTRIBUTION, supra note 381, at ix–x; see also Sneed, supra note 383. 
146 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 26 
 
guidance regarding standards of evidence. However, preponderance 
of the evidence seems proper here. First, and most simply, this paper’s 
claims should succeed only in situations in which plaintiff’s harm 
likely is, in fact, due to climate change. Second, a standard lower than 
preponderance would threaten a deluge of takings litigation because 
climate change surely plays some role, however small, in nearly all 
floods and fires. Finally, the standard for proximate cause—here, 
clear and convincing evidence386—must be stricter than that for 
cause-in-fact. 
 
b. Whether the federal government’s affirmative role in 
bringing about climate change—plus its specific actions 
or inactions in adapting to a particular climate change 
effect—amount to a “substantial factor” in causing 
plaintiff’s harm 
Tort law’s default approach to cause-in-fact is “but for” 
causation, which counsels holding a defendant liable when plaintiff’s 
“harm would not have occurred absent the conduct.”387 In the context 
of the first successful scenario supra, for example, the “but for” claim 
would proceed as follows: but for the United States’ encouragement 
of fossil fuel emitting industries in addition to FEMA’s failure to 
update flood maps as required by law, plaintiff’s harm would not have 
occurred because plaintiff would not have built a home where she did.  
Under this standard, the United States would be liable in all 
three successful scenarios supra. The first scenario was already 
discussed, and the federal government would be liable for exactly the 
same reasons in the second successful scenario based on storm surge. 
In the third scenario, the government was the “but for” cause of 
plaintiff’s harm because it did not complete the controlled burn and 
mechanical thinning that would have prevented the wildfire. 
Still, as courts have done in similar contexts, courts here 
should slightly relax the “but for” standard and instead adopt a 
                                                 
386 I employ clear and convincing evidence as the standard for proximate cause because courts 
seem to require some level of proof higher than a preponderance but lower than certainty, or 
even beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to hold a defendant liable for a taking. 
387 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 (Am. Law Inst. 
2010); cf. Stubbs v. City of Rochester, 226 N.Y. 516 (1919) (applying the standard). 
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“substantial factor” test, which is employed in tort law when there are 
multiple sufficient causes of plaintiff’s harm and irreducible certainty 
about what exactly caused plaintiff’s harm.388 In the takings context, 
the Supreme Court previously has tacitly accepted the “substantial 
factor” test as justification of factual causation.389 This approach 
comports with courts’ approaches in similar instances of widespread, 
complex harm.  
In the three successful scenarios supra, the federal 
government might argue that some other entity is the actual sufficient 
cause of plaintiff’s harm.390 For example, the federal government 
might argue that while the United States is responsible for 27 percent 
of the world’s cumulative, anthropogenic GHG output, most of that 
output was actually emitted by private parties (even if the government 
incentivized their behavior).391 Or, the United States might argue that 
while FEMA, for example, may not have redrawn flood maps, local 
governments are the actual cause of plaintiff’s harm because of 
irresponsible zoning decisions.  
But the fact that other actors might also be liable via different 
                                                 
388 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (Am. Law Inst. 
2010); Anderson v. Minneapolis, 146 Minn. 430 (1920) (applying the standard in the context 
of a parcel being destroyed simultaneously by two separate fires). 
389 See Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 109–10 (noting that in John Horstmann Co. v. United States, 
257 U.S. 138 (1921), plaintiffs in the trial court “essentially tracked the substantial factor test 
of causation borrowed from torts,” and that the “Supreme Court acknowledged this finding” 
and believed that cause-in-fact did exist); but see Columbia Basin Orchard v. United States, 
132 Ct. Cl. 445 (1955) (finding no causal connection when “[t]he most that can be said is that 
the discharge of the waters from the shaft into the lake was a contributing factor towards its 
overflow, or the seepage into it . . . .”). 
390
 Note that tort law occasionally in these situations—particularly in diethylstilbestrol (DES) 
cases in the 1980s—has imposed liability by using a burden-shifting theory of market share 
liability. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 518 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1987). While these cases factually are perhaps the closest parallel to 
the claims in this paper, I do not advocate them because of their novelty.  
391 See, e.g., Jackson Court Condos. v. City of New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1081 (5th Cir. 
1989) (“There is no evidence to indicate that the city’s action was the sole cause of the 
bankruptcy. This was a typical business failure, perhaps abetted somewhat by zoning.”); 
Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding that the presence of 
other causal factors made the connection too attenuated to sustain a takings claim); Laitos, 
supra note 37, at 1208 (noting that “defendants assert this . . . defense most frequent when 
they are able to identify another government or private actor that is more responsible for the 
plaintiff’s harm”). 
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avenues for a particular plaintiff’s harm does not foreclose a 
successful inverse condemnation claim if a plaintiff proves the 
elements of the claim. Some courts, in fact, have held the government 
liable despite multiple potential causes of a particular harm. In Saint 
Bernard Par. Gov’t, for example, the government argued that it was 
not the negligent construction and upkeep of the MR-GO that caused 
the devastating effects of Hurricane Katrina, but rather subsidence, 
sea level rise, and land loss, which were all outside of the 
government’s control. While the court acknowledged that subsidence, 
sea level rise, and land loss certainly contributed to plaintiffs’ harms, 
it held the government responsible because its conduct—irrespective 
of other potential causes—established causation.392 
Other areas of law, too, have slightly relaxed threshold 
causation requirements in complex factual circumstances. For 
example, in the context of the Fair Housing Act,393 a plaintiff may 
make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment by “showing that 
animus against the protected group was a significant factor in the” 
defendant’s position.394 And in the context of nuisance claims, too, a 
defendant may be liable when it has been a “substantial factor in 
bringing about the alleged harm.”395 Finally, courts have relaxed 
causation standards in the standing context: plaintiffs in Juliana v. 
United States established standing based on the United States’ 27 
percent contribution to global GHG emissions because that was a 
“substantial share.”396 
                                                 
392 See Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 743 (holding that “the MR-GO had the 
principal causal role in creating the environmental damage in St. Bernard Polder”) (emphasis 
added). 
393 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (2012). 
394 MHANY Mgmt, Inc. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 606 (2d Cir. 2016); see also SINGER, 
supra note 39, at 620–22. 
395 Page Cty. Appliance Ctr., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 171, 182 (Iowa 1984) 
(internal quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 834 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1979) (“When a person is only one of several persons 
participating in carrying on an activity, his participation must be substantial before he can be 
held liable for the harm resulting from it. This is true because to be a legal cause of harm a 
person’s conduct must be a substantial factor in bringing it about.”) (emphasis added); 
SINGER, supra note 39, at 106. 
396 See Juliana, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1245; Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525–26 (employing 
similar logic in holding that plaintiffs had satisfied the redressability prong of Article III’s 
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Precedent in takings jurisprudence, tort law, and other areas 
of law all suggest that in the context of a complex claim with multiple 
potential causes—such as the claims this paper advocates—there is 
good reason to use the “substantial factor” test to assess cause-in-fact. 
Doing so would neither open the floodgates to the type of claim this 
paper advocates nor blur the line between tort law and takings 
jurisprudence any more than it already is.397 Proximate cause 
considerations, too,398 will further limit the federal government’s 
liability. On the other hand, not employing the “substantial factor” 
test would result in shutting out some plaintiffs who might be 
constitutionally guaranteed just compensation from the federal 
government. 
 
2. Proximate (moral) cause 
Once a court has concluded that the United States is a cause-
in-fact of plaintiff’s harm, the next consideration is proximate, or 
moral, cause. In tort law, courts employ proximate cause to limit 
defendants’ accountability among torts for which they are causes-in-
fact.399 Often, an element of foreseeability is thought to be 
required.400 While courts have not articulated a clear proximate cause 
test in the takings realm, courts seem concerned mainly with ensuring 
that the federal government be held responsible only for harms which 
it either intended or could have foreseen, so that it is neither made an 
insurer of last resort nor deterred from helpful action.  
This paper proposes a test in line with precedent that ensures 
the government will be held responsible only for harms which it 
proximately caused. The government has proximately caused 
                                                 
standing requirement, even though “regulating motor-vehicle emissions will not by itself 
reverse global warming” because a “reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of 
global emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere”). 
397 See, e.g., Hansen, 65 Fed. Cl. at 101 (“[A]n encroachment on property that constitutes a 
taking if committed by the government constitutes a tort if committed by a private party.”). 
398 See infra Section VII.D.2. 
399 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 (Am. Law Inst. 2010) (explaining the concept 
as follows: “An actor’s liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made 
the actor’s conduct tortious”). 
400 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Is. R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928) (finding that defendant was 
not liable to an entirely unforeseeable plaintiff). 
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plaintiff’s harm when clear and convincing evidence suggests that the 
government either knew or should have known that its actions to 
combat plaintiff’s harm were inadequate or that its inactions would 
pose a significant risk of serious harm that did, in fact, materialize.  
3. Precedent suggests “known or should have known” test 
While courts have not used the phrase explicitly, precedent 
suggests that courts have been applying a “knew or should have 
known” standard in order to assess whether the federal government 
in a particular case has proximately caused plaintiff’s harm. When the 
government acts with knowledge that its action will cause a physical 
invasion of private property and that invasion makes the property 
uninhabitable, this unequivocally constitutes a taking.401 But ensuing 
cases have made clear that if the government should have known that 
its action (or inaction) would cause a physical invasion on plaintiff’s 
property, that also constitutes a taking. For example, in United States 
v. Causby, the Supreme Court held the federal government liable for 
a taking despite the government’s lack of actual knowledge regarding 
the consequences of its actions. In Causby, frequent military flights at 
a low altitude over plaintiff’s property made it impossible for plaintiff 
to use his land for its reasonable, intended use as a chicken farm 
because the frequent flights so scared plaintiff’s chickens that they 
often flew into the walls of their coop and killed themselves.402 
Plainly, the federal government did not know that its flights would 
lead to such a result. Nevertheless, the court held the federal 
government liable. 
In Cotton Land Co. v. United States,403 too, actual knowledge 
was lacking, but because the government should have known about 
the significant risk of plaintiff’s harm materializing, the court held the 
federal government liable. In Cotton Land, the government’s 
construction and operation of Parker Dam inundated lands that would 
not obviously have been flooded as a result of Parker Dam’s 
construction. Still, the court found that this physical invasion 
                                                 
401 See supra Part II. 
402 See 328 U.S. at 259. 
403 109 Ct. Cl. 816 (1948). 
2019]  151 
 
amounted to a taking. While the government may not have actually 
known that erecting Parker Dam would lead to the subsequent 
flooding of plaintiff’s land, the court did not believe that actual 
knowledge was necessary.404 Instead, the fact that the government 
should have known its constructing Parker Dam would lead to 
flooding on plaintiff’s property was sufficient to hold it liable for a 
taking. The court explained: “If engineers had studied the question in 
advance they would . . . have predicted what occurred” because the 
“loss resulted naturally from the improvement.” 405 
Similarly, in Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t, the Court of Federal 
Claims found the federal government liable for a taking based on both 
actual knowledge and what the government should have known. In 
this case, the ACE both actually knew—from Corps reports, EPA 
studies, and academic papers—and should have known the significant 
risk of serious harm in not maintaining the MR-GO.406 And in Ark. 
Game II407—on remand from the Supreme Court—the Federal 
Circuit similarly found that when the ACE engaged in seasonal dam 
releases that flooded an area downstream, the resulting physical 
invasion was compensable as a taking even though the ACE did not 
actually know whether downstream flooding would result from its 
actions. The federal government was liable because the ACE would 
have known—had they undertaken “a reasonable investigation . . . 
prior to implementing the deviations”408—that such flooding would 
result.  
Finally, in Hansen v. United States, plaintiff sued the federal 
government because the Forest Service had, in federal land adjacent 
to plaintiff’s property, buried cans of ethylene dibromide (EDB) that 
contaminated water under plaintiff’s property.409 Even though the 
Forest Service did not actually know that EDB would contaminate 
plaintiff’s groundwater, the court held that plaintiff need not show 
specific knowledge to succeed in an inverse condemnation claim 
                                                 
404 See id. at 831–32. 
405 Id. at 829. 
406 Saint Bernard Par. Gov’t, 121 Fed. Cl. at 720–23. 
407 736 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
408 736 F.3d at 1364–73. 
409 65 Fed. Cl. at 81. 
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because the “plain meaning of the Takings Clause” did not require 
specific knowledge.410 
a. “Direct, natural, or probable result” test is not the law and 
is better articulated by “known or should have known” 
test 
Some courts have attempted to distinguish torts from takings 
based on whether “the asserted invasion is the direct, natural, or 
probable result” of governmental action “and not the incidental or 
consequential injury inflicted by the action.”411 However, this 
language simply exempts the government from liability for harms 
improbable enough that the federal government should not have been 
expected to know of them. The “known or should have known” test 
better articulates this goal. In addition, the Court has implicitly 
rejected the “directness” formulation. 
Sanguinetti v. United States412 and Ridge Line, Inc. v. United 
States are two cases most responsible for promulgating the 
“directness” test, but a close examination of both cases reveals that 
they actually align with the “known or should have known” test. In 
Sanguinetti, the Court refused to hold the federal government liable 
when a government-constructed canal failed to carry away flood 
waters in a “flood of unprecedented severity” because “[i]t was not 
shown that the overflow was the direct or necessary result of the 
structure.”413 However, the following sentence reads: “nor that it was 
within the contemplation of or reasonably to be anticipated by the 
government.”414 This formulation mirrors exactly the “known or 
should have known” test.  
In Ridge Line, plaintiff attempted to hold the federal 
government accountable for a taking when the Postal Service 
constructed a facility on land that had previously served to absorb 
storm runoff that, after the facility was built, instead flooded 
                                                 
410 Id. 
411 Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
412 264 U.S. 146 (1924). 
413 Id. at 147, 149–50. 
414 Id. at 150. 
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plaintiff’s land.415 The Federal Circuit remanded and instructed the 
Court of Federal Claims to determine whether “the asserted invasion 
is the direct, natural, or probable result of an authorized activity and 
not the incidental or consequential injury inflicted by the action.”416 
The court went on, though, to instruct the lower court specifically to 
determine whether the increased runoff was “the predictable result of 
the government action.”417 “Predictable result” here echoes “should 
have known.” 
In addition, the Supreme Court in Ark. Game considered both 
Sanguinetti and Ridge Line but did not adopt their directness test. 
Rather, the Court cited Ridge Line to support the following 
proposition: “relevant to the takings inquiry is the degree to which the 
invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of authorized 
government action.”418 The reference to foreseeability and eschewing 
of the directness test appears to indicate that the “known or should 
have known” test is closest to current takings jurisprudence. 
b. Applied to the scenarios 
In each of the three successful scenarios supra, the federal 
government has proximately caused plaintiff’s harm because clear 
and convincing evidence suggests that the government either knew or 
should have known that its actions to combat plaintiff’s harm were 
inadequate or that its inactions would pose a significant risk of serious 
harm that did, in fact, materialize.  
In the first successful scenario of flood by sea level rise on 
coastal property, clear and convincing evidence suggests that FEMA 
knew that its flood maps were outdated and so posed a significant risk 
of serious harm because plaintiffs might detrimentally rely on them. 
Even if FEMA did not actually know that its inaction would lead to 
significant risk of serious harm, it should have known because under 
42 U.S.C. 4101(e), FEMA must reassess its flood maps every five 
years. In the second successful scenario, the theory of liability is 
                                                 
415 346 F.3d at 1350–51. 
416 Id. at 1355 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
417 Id. at 1356. 
418 Ark. Game, 568 U.S. at 39. 
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almost exactly the same. 
In the third successful scenario of a wildfire spreading from 
an overgrown forest and razing parcels in a poor, adjacent 
neighborhood, clear and convincing evidence also suggests that one 
of the federal entities responsible for firefights and forest 
maintenance—say, the Forest Service—knew or should have known 
that its inaction in not undertaking controlled burns and mechanical 
thinning in the overgrown forest posed a significant risk of serious 
harm. The Forest Service here would have had actual knowledge 
because it had planned to undertake controlled burns and mechanical 
thinning to address the overgrown forest’s danger, and scientists and 
climatologists repeatedly told the Forest Service that its inaction was 
dangerous.  
In contrast, each of the two unsuccessful scenarios supra—if 
it has not already failed elsewhere in the five-factor takings test that 
this paper advocates—would fail here. In the first unsuccessful 
scenario regarding a category four hurricane in Seattle, a court likely 
would have dismissed the claim for lack of cause-in-fact because the 
preponderance of the evidence suggests neither that the underlying 
cause of plaintiff’s harm was due to climate change nor that the 
government was a “substantial factor” in plaintiff’s harm. If the claim 
were mistakenly not dismissed, a court would dismiss it here because 
clear and convincing evidence does not suggest that FEMA knew or 
should have known that its inaction would lead to significant risk of 
serious harm. The government did not know that a hurricane would 
strike Seattle, and it should not have known, for even scientists and 
climatologists did not anticipate it. 
In the second unsuccessful scenario, recall that the federal 
government—say, the Forest Service—attempted to address the 
significant risk of serious harm from wildfire by undertaking 
controlled burns and mechanical thinning in the overgrown forest at 
issue, but still a wildfire occurred the following year. Here, the 
government would not be liable because while the government knew 
that there had been significant risk of serious harm by wildfire, the 
government took action to ameliorate that significant risk. The 
government should not have known of residual, significant risk of 
serious harm stemming from that recently treated forest. 
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The proximate cause test articulated here protects against a 
“deluge of takings liability.”419 While the slippery slope argument 
lacks merit anyway if the inverse condemnation claim is 
meritorious,420 there will always be opportunistic or unfortunate 
plaintiffs whose claims will not rise to the level of a taking. This 
paper’s proximate cause test and substantiality requirements, see infra 
Part VII.E, appropriately separate meritorious claims from 
opportunistic ones to avoid making the government an insurer of last 
resort for natural disasters. 
c. Substantiality 
While articulated differently in different cases,421 the point of 
the final requirement is that the “[s]everity of the interference figures 
in the calculus as well.”422 The three successful scenarios supra will 
all surely soar easily over this final hurdle because in each of the 
scenarios the land invaded by either water or fire is uninhabitable. The 
substantiality prong (along with the proximate cause test) will ensure 
that only meritorious inverse condemnation claims succeed. 
Consideration of the substantiality of plaintiff’s harm overlaps with 
the consideration of “significant risk of serious harm” in the 
proximate cause test that this paper advocates supra.  
 
                                                 
419 Id. at 37.  
420 See id. at 36 (noting that “[t]he slippery slope argument . . . is hardly novel or unique to 
flooding cases”); cf. Juliana, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1262 (“A deep resistance to change runs 
through defendants’ . . . arguments for dismissal: they contend a decision recognizing 
plaintiffs’ standing to sue, deeming the controversy justiciable, and recognizing a federal 
public trust and a fundamental right to climate system capable of sustaining human life would 
be unprecedented, as though that alone requires its dismissal. This lawsuit may be 
groundbreaking, but that fact does not alter the legal standards governing the motions to 
dismiss. Indeed, the seriousness of plaintiffs’ allegations underscores how vitally important 
it is for this Court to apply those standards carefully and correctly.”). 
421 E.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (articulating substantiality as “the economic 
impact of the regulation on the claimant”); Ridge Line, 346 F.3d at 1356 (requiring that the 
invasion “preempt the owner[’]s right to enjoy his property for an extended period of time 
rather than merely inflict an injury that reduces its value”). 
422 Ark. Game, 568 U.S. at 39. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Today, the world is hotter than ever before and concomitant 
climate effects—such as sea level rise, ocean surface temperature rise, 
increased regional incidence of drought, and heat wave—affect 
people’s property directly through physical invasions such as floods 
and fires. Some owners whose property is physically invaded in such 
a way should have recourse against the United States government—
the most culpable GHG emitter in the entire world—through the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. For over a century, the 
United States government encouraged the fossil fuel industry to burn 
extraordinary amounts oil, coal, and natural gas. Even though under 
numerous constitutional and statutory duties to prevent physical 
invasions of private property, the federal government has failed (and 
will surely continue to fail) to adapt to climate change effects in 
certain instances. Courts can use the five-factor test laid out by this 
paper—and the three successful and two unsuccessful scenarios as 
illustrations—to determine whether a particular plaintiff’s claim 
against the federal government in this context should succeed. While 
the government should not be the insurer of last resort for every 
natural disaster, it should be liable for just compensation when it has 
caused—through both its actions in promoting climate change and 
failing to adapt to particular climate change effects—a physical 
invasion of plaintiff’s private property. 
 
